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INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT)' embodies
international law's answer to the most important question of our age:
how to reduce the threat of global nuclear conflagration. 2 As the corner-
stone of the international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weaponry, the NPT has been and continues to be an impressive success.3
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force March 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT].
The NPT has over 170 States Parties. The NPT regime, as referred to in this article, consists
of: the Treaty; the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done Oct. 26, 1956, 8
U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 29, 1957) [hereinafter IAEA Statute];
national safeguards agreements negotiated on the basis of the NPT model safeguards agree-
ments contained in The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States
Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA
Doc. INFCIRC/153 (May 1971) [hereinafter INFCIRC/153]; and the "common law" of NPT
verification that has developed in 20 years of practice.
2. President Clinton recently described efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation
as "our most serious task and our most solemn obligation." President William Clinton,
Remarks at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom Policy Conference (Mar. 1, 1995).
3. Most analysts express respect for its widespread success.
[T]he NPT enjoys the widest adherence of any arms control. agreement in history.
As the only nuclear non-proliferation agreement of global reach, the treaty has
codified an international standard of behavior against which actions of even states
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Yet, recent developments suggest that the NPT can, and perhaps should,
be strengthened, especially with regard to investigation of non-compli-
ance. The consequences of nuclear proliferation are of such obvious
severity that improvements in the NPT should be pursued without fear
of disturbing its political support.4
Recent events have sharpened proliferation anxieties. First, the
Soviet Union's breakup left nuclear weapons in various republics.5 The
NPT may be credited with providing a framework under which the new
states of the former Soviet Union could adhere to non-proliferation
principles.6 As a result, most observers believe that there will be no
Soviet nuclear weapons outside Russia by 1996. 7 However, the Soviet
outside the regime are measured. . [T]he nearly 25 years the NPT has been in
force have been free of a single addition to this list of declared nuclear powers.
Thomas Graham, Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament, Statement to the USIA Foreign Press Center (Dec. 13, 1994); see also
Jozef Goldblat, The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Status of Implementation and the Threatening
Developments, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 2
(M.P. Fry et al. eds., 1990) (noting that the NPT's record of compliance is unprecedented for
arms control agreements).
4. Simply put, "[niuclear technology makes it possible to release more energy in one
micro-second from a single nuclear weapon than all the energy released by conventional
weapons used in all wars throughout history." UNITED NATIONS DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT
AFFAIRS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY at 9, U.N. Doc. A/45/373, U.N.
Sales No. E.91.IX.12 (1991). For a discussion of the terrifying risks posed by nuclear
proliferation, see John H. Nuckolls, Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers: Proliferation and
Terrorism, 267 SCIENCE 1112 (1995).
5. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan, in addition to Russia, were left with nuclear weap-
ons when the Soviet Union disintegrated. At that time, Ukraine became the third largest
nuclear power with approximately 4,000 weapons, while Belarus was left with approximately
1200. John M. Broder & Stanley Meisler, Terrifying Quest for A-Arms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1992, at Al, A8. Kazakstan was left with approximately 1800 weapons, but 1150 of these
were strategic weapons capable of reaching the United States, only slightly fewer than the
1300 strategic weapons left in Ukraine. Id.; see also Perry in Kazakhstan to Discuss Nuclear
Issues, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
6. In November 1994, Ukraine became the last of the four weapons-possessing former
Soviet Republics to ratify the NPT. By ratifying, Ukraine joined Belarus and Kazakstan as
eligible to receive nearly $650 million from the United States to assist in shipping their
weapons to Russia or to destroy them in exchange for United States economic assistance.
Douglas Jehl, Ukrainian Agrees to Dismantle A-Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994, at A6; see
also Jane Perlez, Treaty to Cut A-Weapons Now in Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at A10.
7. Ukraine has removed the nuclear warheads from all 46 of its SS-24s and over half of
its 130 SS-19s and plans to be rid of all its nuclear weapons by 1996. Perry Giving Ukraine
Aid to Scrap Weapons, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1995, at A21. Belarus should complete the task
earlier, transferring its last SS-25 missiles to Russia by July, 1995. Belarus to Complete
Nuclear Arms Transfer to Russia by July, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 15, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Kazakstan has been transferring its missiles and
nuclear bombers to Russia while the United States has purchased its weapons-grade fissile
material. This process should leave Kazakstan free of nuclear weapons by 1996. Perry in
Kazakhstan to Discuss Nuclear Issues, supra note 5.
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Union's breakup has raised fears that components of their weapons will
spread to other States or sub-national groups.8 Indeed, small amounts of
plutonium and enriched uranium smuggled from nuclear facilities have
been seized in Eastern Europe. 9 Since only a small amount of enriched
uranium and an even smaller amount of plutonium is necessary to make
a nuclear weapon, any potential failure or shortcoming of current safe-
guards could prove catastrophic.
Second, the discovery of an Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons
program demonstrated that an NPT State Party, apparently in good
standing, could pursue a weapons program undetected.' ° Iraq's billion
dollar investment in a nuclear weapons program was largely accom-
plished with the aid of foreign suppliers providing technical assistance,
materials and equipment." Through a secret procurement network, Iraq
began a parallel program to enrich its indigenous uranium, avoiding
scrutiny by inspectors who monitored only its declared nuclear power
facilities. 12 Because of the program's secrecy, Iraq's nuclear capabilities
might have escaped detection if not for the extraordinarily intrusive
search for weapons of mass destruction to which Iraq was subject after
its defeat.' 3
8. Although Russian nuclear weapons remain protected, the lack of adequate security and
control of fissile materials have left these stockpiles vulnerable to diversion. David Albright &
Kevin O'Neill, Jury-Rigged, but Working, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Jan. 1995, at 23. See
generally Barry Kellman and David Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear Window: A Legal
Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling (forthcoming).
9. Experts are unsure of the exact quantities that have been removed from existing
stockpiles in the former Soviet Union. See Jane Perlez, Tracing a Nuclear Risk: Stolen
Enriched Uranium, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at A3; see also National Security Military
Procurement FY96 Defense Authorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military
Procurement and the Subcomm. on Research and Development of the House Comm. on
National Security, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Gary Milhollin, Professor,
University of Wisconsin Law School).
10. With support of foreign suppliers, Iraq was on the verge of nuclear weapons capabili-
ties prior to IAEA detection in 1991. See generally R. Jeffrey Smith, Iraq's Secret A-Arms
Effort: Grim Lessons for the World, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1991, at C1; Rolf Ekeus, The
Iraqi Experience and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation, WASH. Q., Autumn 1992, at 67.
11. This assistance was vital in the development of two enrichment facilities which
required highly technical knowledge and equipment. The antiquated uranium enrichment
method employed at the two locations is known as electromagnetic isotope separation. Iraq
was also in the process of developing a more sophisticated enrichment process employing
centrifuge capabilities. See Lawrence Scheinman, Lessons from Post-War Iraq for the
International Full-Scope Safeguards Regime, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1993, at 3. For a
discussion of German exports to Iraq's nuclear program, see Barry Kellman, Bridling the
International Trade of Catastrophic Weaponry, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 755, 787-89 (1994).
12. See Ekeus, supra note 10, at 70.
13. These special verification efforts included a combination of chemical and isotopic
analysis of samples, defector-generated information and assistance of experts familiar with
Iraq's enrichment process. More aggressive verification efforts came from shared resources
and highly sensitive information from various nations including an American-piloted U-2
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Third, using inspection techniques employed during the post-Gulf
War inspections in Iraq, concerns arose that North Korea had not de-
clared all of the plutonium it had separated. 14 It has been widely report-
ed that North Korea had secretly built a small reactor and an associated
plutonium separation plant and was building two larger reactors despite
declaring that it had separated only a small quantity of plutonium. 5
North Korea's resistance to NPT inspections exhibits some limitations of
NPT safeguards.
16
These episodes reinforce public attention on the continuing threat
posed by the spread of nuclear weapons and powerfully dramatize the
importance of the NPT in addressing that threat. The NPT undergirds
the global norm against proliferation and establishes the ignominy of
possessing clandestine nuclear weapons as a principle of international
law. 17 That said, many analysts, while acknowledging the treaty's ac-
complishments, have suggested that the NPT's basic mechanisms need
to be reexamined and perhaps adjusted.'"
reconnaissance aircraft loaned to UNSCOM to provide intelligence data. See JULIE L. KLARE
& JEFFERY H. GROTEE, REPORT FOR THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY: IMPLICATIONS OF THE
UNSCOM EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ FOR ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION REGIMES 11 (Institute for
Defense Analysis IDA Paper No. P-2835, 1993).
14. See generally CHARLES BALL, STOPPING NORTH KOREAN NUKES: POSSIBLE WITH-
OUT WAR? 25 (Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab. Director's Series on Proliferation No. UCRL-
LR- 114070-5, 1994); see Marc D. Millot, Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear
Adversaries, WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 41.
15. Based on IAEA evidence and its own analysis, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
believed that the North had probably separated enough plutonium for one or two nuclear
weapons. David Albright, How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?, BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 46.
16. See U.S.-N. Korea Nuclear Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on East Asian
and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(testimony of Robert L. Gallucci, Ambassador-at-Large).
1 17. It should also be noted that the NPT has played an essential role in persuading
numerous countries, including Brazil and Argentina, to eschew nuclear weapons programs and
South Africa to dismantle their nuclear weapons. In addition, Sweden, the former Yugoslavia,
and other nations have been persuaded to turn away from the development of nuclear
weapons.
18. See generally DAVID FISCHER, TOWARDS 1995: THE PROSPECTS FOR ENDING THE
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1993); COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION - CONFRONTING THE NEW CHALLENGES (1995); JAMES F. KEELEY, INTER-
NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS: OBSERVATIONS ON LESSONS FOR VERIFY-
ING A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1988); Michael M. May, Nuclear Weapons Supply
and Demand, 82 AM. SCIENTIST 526 (1994); Marvin H. Miller, Stemming the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons, TECH. REV., Aug. 1987; Roger C. Molander & Peter A. Wilson, On
Dealing with the Prospect of Nuclear Chaos, WASH. Q., Summer 1994.
The apparent failure to detect the Iraqi nuclear weapons program has prompted consider-
able reexamination of the entire NPT regime by some of its most high-ranking officials and
supporters. See Hans Blix, Verification of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Lesson of Iraq,
WASH. Q., Autumn 1992, at 57; ANTHONY FAINBERG, STAN. U. CTR. FOR INT'L SECURITY &
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Since 1991, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
considered strategies to strengthen the effectiveness of NPT safeguards
- particularly in regard to detecting activities and facilities not declared
under the treaty.19 In general terms, the IAEA seeks to achieve greater
transparency, openness, and unpredictability in its verification scheme.
20
In furtherance of this policy, the Standing Advisory Group on Safe-
guards Implementation (SAGSI), an independent expert group appointed
by the Director General of the IAEA, 2' has outlined an approach to
enhance the effectiveness of safeguards. 22
This article analyzes in-depth the SAGSI recommendation that more
effective safeguards draw upon "the elements (including the managed
access provisions) contained in Part X of the Verification Annex to the
Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 23 SAGSI found
ARMS CONTROL, STRENGTHENING IAEA SAFEGUARDS: LESSONS FROM IRAQ (1993); KLARE &
GROTEE, supra note 13; Joseph F. Pilat, Iraq and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The
Roles of Inspections and Treaties, 255 SCIENCE 1224 (1992); Scheinman, supra note 11; see
also Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(testimony of Lynn E. Davis, Undersec. of State for Int'l Security Aff.). ("The experience
with Iraq was an important lesson. we must be prepared to confront the threat that certain
states are willing to disregard their obligations under the NPT. To that end, we are working to
strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system, including the use of special inspections and
environmental sampling in order to improve its capabilities to detect clandestine activities.").
19. See Report to the Director General on the 36th Series of SAGS! Meetings, at 17
(Apr. 19-23, 1993) [hereinafter SAGS! Report]. Statements made at the 1990 NPT Review
Conference and the Director General's statement during the February 1991 Board of
Governor's meeting spoke of the need for more effective safeguards and identified specific
issues to be addressed. Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the
Safeguards System: Report by the Director General, at 1, IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17 (Aug.
29, 1994) [hereinafter IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17]; see generally Gamini Seneviratne &
Ann MacLachlan, JAEA Preparing New Safeguards System for Presentation to NPT Meeting,
NUCLEAR FUEL, Oct. 24, 1994, at 10.
20. "Transparency" refers to the completeness of a State's declarations as to its nuclear
program from a wide range of sources. "Openness" refers to the rights of prompt access
granted to the IAEA to verify or confirm declarations. IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17, supra
note 19, at 18-19. To enhance unpredictability, access might be at short or no notice with
respect to an inspection's timing, location, and the range of activities to be verified.
21. See Senthil Ratnasabapathy, Disarmament: IAEA Seeks Enhanced Powers to Check
Proliferation, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
22. See SAGS! Report, supra note 19, at 22 ("[Tlhe Agency's current safeguards must be
enhanced to provide significant confidence as to the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities
as well as of the absence of undeclared activities at declared nuclear facilities."). The IAEA
has considered that report's recommendations and assessed means of implementing them.
23. See id. at 7. The IAEA Board of Governors has identified several provisions of the
CWC that differ from the NPT regime and has suggested that adopting similar measures in
IAEA arrangements with State Parties would substantially enhance the effectiveness of
safeguards.
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that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)24 offers approaches for
verification and investigation that may be adaptable to the NPT.
It is altogether appropriate that SAGSI should recommend examina-
tion of the CWC. The CWC is the latest contribution to the development
of the international law of weapons control. In terms of its fundamental
moral objectives, the CWC follows a long tradition of efforts to control
the methods of warfare. 25 The CWC is novel because it represents an
unprecedented multilateral effort to eradicate an entire category of
catastrophic weapons and assure their continued absence through a far-
reaching system to verify compliance. 26 The Convention propounds a
comprehensive regulatory regime to effectuate its objectives that is the
most elaborately detailed codification of principles and methodologies to
control weapons of war worldwide. 7
The CWC contributes, therefore, not only to the international law of
armed conflict by establishing substantive rules of permissible conduct;
analogous to any legal code, it establishes a governance system that may
be adapted to related but distinct spheres of activity. As the threat of
nuclear weapons compels consideration of new approaches, comparing
the CWC with the NPT becomes more than an academic exercise. This
24. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter CWC]. As of August, 1995, the CWC has 159 signatories and has
been ratified by 35 countries. Search of PTS-OPCW PrepCom Home Page,
http://www.opcw.nl/info.htm (Aug. 25, 1995). The CWC will enter into force 180 days after
the 65th country deposits its instrument of ratification. CWC art. XIX. Two important parts of
the CWC are the Annex on Implementation and Verification, id. at 824 [hereinafter Verifica-
tion Annex] and the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information, id. at 871 [herein-
after Confidentiality Annex].
25. Indeed, medieval knights were restricted by the law of arms from using poison gas.
More recently, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65, has embodied during this century the prohibition against using poisons as
weapons. These efforts and manifold other agreements, cumulatively, comprise the interna-
tional law of weapons control, which may accurately be considered a subset of the broader
category of laws of armed conflict and war crimes. "For over seven thousand years, humani-
tarian principles regulating armed conflicts evolved gradually in different civilizations. In
time, these humanitarian principles formed a protective fabric of norms and rules designed to
prevent certain forms of physical harm and hardships from befalling innocent civilian non-
combatants[.]" M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 150 (1992).
26. See Fred Webber, To Stop Poison Gas Attacks, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1995, at A23.
27. United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, speaking at the ceremony
opening the CWC for signature in Paris, France, on Jan. 13, 1993, stated that the CWC "must
go down in history as one of the most tangible signs of the current advance towards a
universal order. . . . [The CWC is] a decisive advance in the history of disarmament." See
generally John Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Speech before the ABA Symposium on Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(Feb. 7, 1995) (transcript on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
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article identifies those aspects of the CWC that may prove instructive to
enhancing NPT verification.
While the CWC built on the NPT's verification mechanisms in
many respects, the CWC proposes potentially more effective methods
for detecting and investigating prohibited weapons activities. Specifical-
ly, the CWC may be a model for expanding and strengthening NPT
safeguards as to: (1) what should be verified, (2) what suspicions trigger
broader or more penetrating verification requirements, and (3) what
limits apply to that power, expanded though it may be. This article
asserts that these are issues of law and that rigorous comparison of two
elaborate international treaties requires legal analysis. Yet, it must be
borne in mind that the CWC has not yet entered into force. Its innova-
tive verification measures have not been implemented and are thus far
unproven.
The timing of this effort is significant. In 1995, the NPT came under
its most important review as to whether it should be extended and, if so,
for how long.' By its own terms, the NPT was to be in force for twen-
ty-five years at which point States Parties would decide whether to
extend it.29 As the 1995 Review Conference approached, some states
asserted that the five declared nuclear weapons states had failed to live
up to their obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament. ° Many states
also pressed for negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty and a
cutoff in the production of fissile materials.31 While these issues are
28. See Alexander T. Lennon, The 1995 NPT Extension Conference, WASH. Q., Autumn
1994, at 202; CAROLINE MILLAR, NPT ExTENSION: LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES 13
(Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab. Director's Series on Proliferation No. UCRL-LR- 114070-7,
1994); Mitchell Reiss, The Last Nuclear Summit, WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 5; John
Simpson, The 1995 NPT Conference, Substantive Issues Will Shape the Outcome, SECURITY
DIALOGUE, 1994, at 223.
29. Joseph Cirincione, Third PrepCom Highlights Uncertainties: NPT Showdown Ahead,
ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1994, at 3.
30. See generally William Epstein, Give More to Get More: Extension of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Nov./Dec. 1994, at 15; David A.
Koplow, Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty?, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 301. Senior officials of the United States govern-
ment respond to these concerns, noting that the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty
(INF) eliminated 2,000 warheads and an entire class of nuclear weapons and that START I
and 11 commit the United States to dismantling another 17,000 weapons as well as their
delivery mechanisms. Graham, supra note 3. However, START II currently awaits the advice
and consent of the U.S. Senate.
31. With regard to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, see John Edmonds, A Complete
Nuclear Test Ban - Why Has It Taken So Long?, 25 SECURITY DIALOGUE 375 (1994). With
regard to a fissile material cut-off, see BRIAN G. CHOW & KENNETH A. SOLOMON, RAND,
LIMITING THE SPREAD OF WEAPON-USABLE FISSILE MATERIALS (1993) (prepared for the
Undersec. of Def. for Pol'y); and Frans Berkhout et al., A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile
Material, 19 INT'L SECURITY 167 (1994). The United States has strongly supported negotia-
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crucial to the success of nuclear non-proliferation efforts and to interna-
tional security generally, their discussion tended to drown out concerns
over less politically-charged issues, including how to strengthen the
NPT's capabilities- to detect non-compliance.
The 174 nations represented at the Review Conference agreed to
indefinitely extend the NPT. This decision, embodied in a document
entitled "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons," was part of a package containing two other documents. First,
"Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" continues the practice
of holding a review conference every five years, but calls for more
systematic preparation on substantive issues. Second, "Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" reaffirms
the goals of complete elimination of nuclear weapons as well as general
and complete disarmament under strict international control. It also
contains a set of twenty principles dealing with: universality, non-prolif-
eration, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapons-free zones, security
assurances, safeguards, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition,
a compromise resolution was agreed that all states in the Middle East
should join the NPT and take steps to establish a Middle Eastern zone
free of weapons of mass destruction.
Since the conclusion of the 1995 Review Conference, the IAEA has
decided to implement changes to its safeguards system by applying
some new information-gathering measures immediately and by negotiat-
ing application of additional measures with individual states. Initially,
the IAEA will require expanded descriptions of the nuclear fuel cycle;
in the second phase, the IAEA will seek declaration of and physical
access to other kinds of locations functionally related to nuclear fuel
cycle operations.33
The following five sections of this article develop a mode of analy-
sis and recommendations designed to build on these recent develop-
ments. Section I is an overview of the major elements of the NPT and
tion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and a cut-off in fissile material in order to be
in the strongest possible position to negotiate indefinite extension of the NPT and to discour-
age other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals. Hearings Before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, supra note 18 (testimony of Lynn E. Davis, Undersec. of State
for Int'l Security Aff.).
32. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the .Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (1995); see generally
William Epstein, Indefinite Extension - With Increased Accountability, BULL. ATOM. SCIEN-
TISTS, July 1995, at 27; Barbara Crossette, Treaty Aimed at Halting Spread of Nuclear
Weapons Extended, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1995, at Al.
33. Gamini Seneviratne, New IAEA Safeguards System to Be Applied in Two Phases,
NUCLEAR FUEL, July 31, 1995, at 10.
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CWC regimes, leaving the description of verification mechanisms to
subsequent sections. Section II describes each regime's record keeping
and reporting scheme and analyzes how the CWC's approach could be
useful in the NPT context. Section III examines CWC routine inspec-
tions and environmental monitoring and applies elements of that scheme
to: 1) develop a risk-based approach to select facilities for inspection;
and 2) suggest methods to improve inspections by increasing inspectors'
rights of access. Section IV describes how each treaty handles suspi-
cions of non-compliance, focusing on the CWC's procedures for chal-
lenge inspections and managed access. Section V presents this article's
conclusions and discusses the possible legal methods to implement
discussed NPT reforms as well as how these measures could affect
protected legal rights.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIMES
The NPT and the CWC are, to date, the most far-reaching and
comprehensive multilateral attempts to control the proliferation of
catastrophic weaponry. Because the CWC was partially modelled after
the NPT, they share many characteristics, including:
* proscription of certain proliferative activities;
• vesting of oversight authority in an international organization; 3'
* requirements to keep records and make regular, verifiable reports to
that organization;
" an obligation to submit to initial and regular inspections to verify
the accuracy of reports, including the taking of samples of moni-
tored substances;
* procedures to protect confidential information;
* a means to settle disputes and obtain clarifications from a State
Party about compliance concerns, and, if necessary, suspicion-based
inspections to investigate non-compliance; and
" an enforcement mechanism that permits recourse to the United
Nations Security Council.
These similarities should not mask crucial distinctions. Although both
regimes share a basic framework, their subject matter, history, and
methodology differ markedly.
34. Treaty compliance determinations are not vested in international organizations.
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This overview presents the elements of each regime, focusing on
their objectives, legal bases, means of institutional oversight, methods to
protect confidential information, trade restrictions, potential penal conse-
quences, and mechanisms to address non-compliance. Both regimes
devote considerable attention to verification efforts, but as following
sections fully discuss these efforts, they are omitted from this overview.
A. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime
The NPT regime, including national safeguards agreements and the
IAEA Statute, embody the international effort to ban illicit transfers of
nuclear material and acquisition or transfer of nuclear weaponry. Re-
gional agreements supplement the NPT. 3
1. Objectives and Primary Obligations
The objectives of the NPT are to: 1) halt the spread of nuclear
weapons development programs, 2) promote nuclear disarmament, and
3) promote the peaceful use of nuclear technologies and materials. The
IAEA Statute fosters these objectives by establishing and administering
safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, facilities, and
information are not used to further military purposes.
The NPT distinguishes between states that tested a nuclear device
prior to 1967 (nuclear weapons states or "NWS") 36 and non-nuclear-
weapon states ("NNWS"). Different obligations apply to each category
of states. In brief, NWS agree: 1) not to assist, encourage, or induce any
NNWS in acquiring nuclear weapons; 37 2) to share the benefits of
peaceful application of nuclear power for civilian purposes;38 and 3) to
attempt to curb the nuclear arms race at an early date.39 The NPT does
not prohibit NWS from producing nuclear weapons. The NNWS agree:
1) not to receive, manufacture, or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive
devices, either directly or indirectly; 40 and 2) to accept international
35. For example, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,
opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (also known as the Tlateloco Treaty),
calls for a regional nuclear-weapons-free zone and establishes the Agency for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).
36. There are five such states: China, France, the former Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and the United States. This category does not include the three republics of the
former Soviet Union that were left with nuclear weapons on their territory: Belarus,
Kazakstan, and Ukraine.
37. NPT, supra note 1, art. I.
38. Id. arts. IV-V.
39. Id. art. VI.
40. Id. art. II.
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safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, under the auspices of
the IAEA, including on-site inspections and other means to verify
compliance with NPT obligations."
2. Legal Bases and Institutional Oversight
Several documents are important to the operation of NPT safe-
guards. Article III of the NPT creates the obligation to accept safeguards
but does not define the framework or procedures to be applied under the
safeguards system. Instead, the NPT uses the system established by the
IAEA, notably the power to apply safeguards42 according to individual
safeguards agreements negotiated on the basis of INFCIRC/153, which
sets out the content and structure of those agreements between NPT
NNWS parties and the IAEA.43
There are two general types of safeguards agreements: 1) those that
apply safeguards to all nuclear material in a country (known as "com-
prehensive" or "full scope" safeguards); and 2) those that apply safe-
guards to a specific quantity of nuclear material." Despite some varia-
tions, independent safeguards agreements closely follow the framework
established in INFCIRC/153. The IAEA and the State Party negotiate,
based on a safeguards agreement, Subsidiary Agreements with more
detailed procedures such as the control measures to be applied at safe-
guarded facilities.45 Subsidiary Agreements consist of two parts: a
general part that applies to the State Party as a whole, and a specific
part, known as a facility attachment, that defines the safeguards provi-
sions for each facility.46
NPT safeguards are administered by the IAEA which comprises
three principal organs.47 The General Conference includes all IAEA
41. Id. art. III.
42. IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. XII.
43. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1.
44. See D.M. Edwards, International Legal Aspects of Safeguards and the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1984).
45. See generally Michael J. Wilmshurst, The Adequacy of IAEA Safeguards for the
1990s, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PRoLIFERATION TREATY 2, 13 (M.P.
Fry et al. eds., 1990). In the interests of national security and to protect the confidentiality of
certain information, Subsidiary Arrangements are not typically released to the public.
46. The general part is negotiated first, followed by the facility attachments. See MARK
MULLEN, VERIFICATION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: SUMMARY OF LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE VERIFICATION EXPERIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY 15 (1991).
47. NPT, supra note 1, art. 111(l). The IAEA is not a party to the NPT nor was it created
by the NPT.
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Member States. 48 The Board of Governors is the executive body
of the IAEA, consisting of 35 members elected or designated based on
geographical distribution. The Secretariat, headed by a Director General
appointed by the Board of Governors, is responsible for IAEA adminis-
tration as well as on-site verification activities.49
3. Restrictions on Trade
The NPT restricts the international transfer of nuclear weapons,
nuclear material, and equipment. NWS cannot transfer nuclear weapons
or nuclear explosive devices "to any recipient whatsoever.'", Nor may a
NNWS receive nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, or the
control thereof, from "any transferor whatsoever. 51 All NPT State
Parties, both NWS and NNWS, must safeguard the transfer to any
NNWS of a) source or fissionable material; or b) equipment or material
designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production' of special
fissionable material for peaceful purposes.
52
The Zangger Committee developed a "trigger list" of materials and
equipment. Shipment of these items to a NNWS triggers the requirement
of IAEA safeguards.53 This trigger list includes components, equipment,
and materials necessary for the nuclear fuel cycle, but does not ban
transfers of sensitive technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing
equipment.5 4 To export nuclear material or equipment to NNWS that are
not NPT parties, supplier states must require that trigger list items will
not be diverted to nuclear weapons and that each recipient state has
negotiated a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Furthermore, suppli-
ers must seek assurances from recipient states that any trigger list items
48. As of mid-1992, there were 114 Member States to the IAEA Statute.
49. NPT, supra note 1, arts. VI-VII.
50. Id. art. I.
51. Id. art. II.
52. Id. art. 111(2).
53. IAEA Doe. INFCIRC/209 (Sept. 1974). Ten States started the Zangger Committee
soon after the NPT entered into force by informing the IAEA of their intentions to require
safeguards on a uniform set of nuclear exports: Australia, Denmark, Canada, Finland, West
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Subsequently, Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg,
Poland, and Sweden sent similar memoranda. See generally Frans Berkhout, The NPT and
Nuclear Export Controls, in NUCLEAR NoN-PROLIFFRATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 45
(Darryl Howlett & John Simpson, eds., 1992).
54. In recent years, the Zangger Committee has completed talks on trigger list equipment
and materials for gas centrifuge enrichment, gaseous diffusion enrichment and reprocessing.
According to the State Department, the U.S. is leading an effort among supplier states to
clarify "additional sensitive technologies" on the list. Fritz W. Schmidt, The Zangger Commit-
tee: Its History and Future Role, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1994, at 38.
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will not be reexported to a third state unless safeguards are effectively
applied in that state.55
To rectify some shortcomings in the Zangger Committee, the Nucle-
ar Suppliers Group (NSG or "London Club") was formed in the 1970s
to draw up a more comprehensive list of materials, equipment, and
technology that would trigger IAEA safeguards when exported to any
NNWS not party to the NPT.56 The NSG's Guidelines for Nuclear
Transfers57 require the recipients of trigger list items to provide effective
physical protection for these items, and to pledge not to use them for the
manufacture of nuclear explosives. 58 If materials are diverted or if
supplier/recipient understandings are violated, NSG members should
consult promptly on possible common action.59
4. Protection of Confidential Information
The IAEA must "take every precaution to protect commercial and
industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its
knowledge in the implementation of the Agreement[,]" and severe
conditions limit how it may publish or communicate any information
obtained in connection with a safeguards agreement. 60 Furthermore, the
IAEA can only require the "minimum amount of information and data
consistent with. carrying out its responsibilities[.]
' 61
Similar restrictions prohibit the Director General and staff (including
inspectors) from disclosing any "industrial. secret or other confidential
information" obtained through their official duties.62 Inspectors may not
seek to obtain confidential information unnecessary to the performance
of their duties, nor unnecessarily reveal any information coming to their
attention. Disciplinary and fiscal penalties can be imposed on IAEA
55. For fear of discrediting the NPT, the Zangger countries cannot target strict nuclear
controls toward certain nations with questionable proliferation credentials.
56. The NSG is nominally separate from the NPT. It allows its members flexibility and
latitude in controlling items to NNWS while enlisting the cooperation of all supplier states.
The NSG "trigger list" includes source and special fissionable material, nuclear reactors and
certain reactor components, non-nuclear materials for reactors such as heavy water and
nuclear-grade graphite, reprocessing plants and equipment, and equipment for the separation
of isotopes of uranium. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254, Annex A (Feb. 1978); see also Joseph
Pilat, The Major Suppliers: A Baseline for Comparison, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TRADE
AND NONPROLIFERATION 39, 39-41 (William C. Potter ed., 1990).
57. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254, supra note 56.
58. See generally Berkhout, supra note 53.
59. See ROLAND TIMERBAEV, MONTEREY INST. OF INT'L STUDIES, A MAJOR MILESTONE
IN CONTROLLING NUCLEAR ExPORTS (1992).
60. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, § 5.
61. Id. § 8.
62. IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. VII(F).
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inspectors for damages due to their negligence or violation of IAEA
regulations.63
5. Penal Consequences
The NPT itself neither includes penal consequences for private
persons who violate its provisions nor requires State Parties to enact
penal legislation to punish individuals who commit treaty violations.
Yet, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,6"
though not squarely part of the NPT regime, requires States Parties to
criminalize several offenses with respect to the handling of nuclear
materials, including inter alia: unauthorized receipt, possession, use,
transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material; theft or
robbery of nuclear material; embezzling or fraudulently obtaining nucle-
ar material; and demanding nuclear material by threat or use of force or
other form of intimidation. 6 The Convention also requires various types
of inter-state cooperation in penal matters and requires States Parties to
include treaty offenses in their extradition treaties66 and to "afford one
another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal
proceedings brought in respect of the offenses set forth in article 7."67
6. Mechanisms to Address Non-Compliance -
The United Nations' Role
If a state refuses to grant access to the IAEA for the purpose of
carrying out safeguards, the IAEA's Board of Governors can "call upon"
the state to take the required action (i.e., comply and grant access) with-
out delay.68 If the state refuses to "take fully corrective action within a
reasonable time," the IAEA Board of Governors may:
1) curtail or suspend assistance being provided by the IAEA or by
another State Party and call for the return of material and equip-
ment made available to the State Party in non-compliance, or
63. Paul C. Szasz, International Atomic Energy Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFE-
GUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 73, 130-32 (Mason Willrich ed., 1973).
64. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, 18 I.L.M.
1419 (1979). As of September 1992, the Convention had 42 signatories. Review Conference
Finds 1987 Nuclear Materials Pact Sound, 18 WORLD ENV'T REP. No. 24, at 202 (Nov. 24,
1992).
65. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, supra note 64, art. 7.
66. Id. art. 11.
67. Id. art. 13.
68. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 118.
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2) suspend the non-complying State Party from the exercise of the
privileges and rights of membership in the IAEA Statute.
If the State Party still refuses to comply, the Board of Governors
may find that the IAEA is not able to verify that there has been no
diversion, and report the matter to the Security Council and General
Assembly of the United Nations. 69 These bodies presumably will be able
to take all measures available to them under the United Nations Char-
ter.7"
B. CWC
The CWC seeks to eradicate an entire category of catastrophic
weapons and to ensure their continued non-production. Unlike the NPT,
the CWC requires disarmament. States Parties having chemical weapons
(CW) must destroy them. The CWC has not adopted the NPT distinction
between weapons and non-weapons states; the CWC's prohibitions and
obligations will apply identically to all States Parties. In most other
respects, the two treaties establish similar regimes with similar ap-
proaches.
1. Objectives and Primary Obligations
The CWC has two goals. First, it mandates declaration and destruc-
tion of existing chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities.7'
Destruction of CW must begin within two years and be completed not
later than ten years after the CWC takes effect.72 Each State Party may
destroy its weapons and facilities by any means it chooses, so long as
the destruction can be verified.73 Second, the CWC seeks to verify that
States Parties do not initiate or resume CW production or storage. Each
State Party may produce and use toxic chemicals for legitimate commer-
cial purposes, but every State Party, including those with no CW to
69. IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. XII(C).
70. The Security Council could find a State Party's non-compliance a threat to interna-
tional peace and security and take appropriate collective action under Chapter VII of the
Charter. See Szasz, supra note 63, at 116.
71. CWC, supra note 24, art. I, If 2-4.
72. Id. art. IV, 6. The destruction of chemical weapons production facilities must begin
within one year and be completed not later than ten years after the CWC takes effect. Id. art.
V, 8.
73. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pts. IV(A), I 13-14, V, I 11, V, I 44(a). Means
of destruction will be subject to each State Party's environmental, health, and safety restric-
tions, CWC, supra note 24, arts. IV, I 11, V, I 11.
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destroy, must ensure that chemicals are not used for CWC-prohibited
purposes. 74
Accordingly, the twelve chemical groups listed on "Schedule 1" in
the Annex on Chemicals 75 that present the greatest risk to the CWC's
object and purpose, may be produced only for research, medical, phar-
maceutical or protective purposes at a single "small-scale" facility or at
"other facilities" in a severely limited quantity and for only limited
purposes. A State Party cannot produce, acquire, retain or use these
chemicals outside the territories of States Parties and cannot transfer
such chemicals outside its territory except to another State Party and
according to several restrictions.
2. Legal Bases and Institutional Oversight
Unlike the NPT, which leaves many details of verification to indi-
vidual safeguards agreements, Subsidiary Arrangements, and facility
attachments, the CWC contains both the general obligations of States
Parties and the entire verification mechanism, including declaration
requirements and detailed inspection timetables and procedures. The
regime's other legally significant documents are facility agreements to
be negotiated with each State Party containing specific inspection proce-
dures to be followed at declared facilities.76
To accomplish its goals, the CWC creates the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an international body that
will monitor the production capabilities and activities of States Parties in
order to ensure that the objectives of the CWC are being met. The
74. CWC, supra note 24, art. VI, '11.
75. The CWC lists chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons on three "Sched-
ules." Schedule 1 includes chemical weapons agents and other chemicals, i.e., their immediate
precursors, that pose a high risk to the CWC's object and purpose. Schedule 2 includes toxic
chemicals and their immediate precursors that pose a significant risk, but have some commer-
cial value. Schedule 3 chemicals, which are produced in large commercial quantities, pose
even less risk but may have been used as CW agents in the past. In addition, declarations
must be made regarding facilities that manufacture organic chemicals beyond certain threshold
quantities, known as "other" or "PSF" (phosphorous, sulfur, fluorine) chemical production
facilities. Id., Annex on Chemicals, pt. A.
76. Under the CWC, Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 facilities must have a facility agreement.
Schedule 3 and "other" facilities will not have such agreements, unless the State Party insists
on one. The OPCW has elaborated model facility agreements. See GENERIC TEXT ELEMENTS
FOR MODEL FACILITY AGREEMENTS (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law);
DISCUSSION PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT: FACILITY SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE
MODEL FACILITY AGREEMENT FOR SINGLE SMALL SCALE FACILITIES, SCHEDULE I FACILI-
TIES, SCHEDULE 2 FACILITIES, AND SCHEDULE 3 FACILITIES (on file with Michigan Journal of
International Law); see also Experts Group on Chemical Industry Activities: Initial Report,
att. 1 (draft facility agreement for Schedule 2 facilities), OPCW Doc. PC-IV/B/WP.5 (July 23,
1993) (revisions of this draft agreement appear in the second and third reports of the Experts
Group on Chemical Industry Facilities) [hereinafter Initial Report].
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OPCW, which comprises three organs, will be vested with extensive
legislative, investigative, and judicial responsibilities. The Conference of
States Parties will be authorized to enact rules of procedure, assess
compliance and resolve issues as to the CWC's scope. The Executive
Council will oversee day-to-day activities, including supervising verifi-
cation. The Technical Secretariat will have primary responsibility for
monitoring and inspecting facilities that could relate to illegal chemical
weapons production.77
3. Restrictions on Trade
To stem international proliferation of chemical weapons, the CWC
restricts transfers of dual-use chemicals. Any transfer of weapons agents
or their precursors among States Parties must be for purposes not pro-
hibited by the CWC. No State Party may assist, encourage, or induce
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party by the
CWC.7 ' A State Party may transfer Schedule 1 chemicals outside its
territory only to another State Party and only for research, medical,
pharmaceutical, or protective purposes. Both the transferring and receiv-
ing States Parties must notify the Technical Secretariat of each transfer
of these chemicals and annually declare the previous year's transfers.79
Chemicals listed on Schedule 2 may be transferred only to or re-
ceived from' States Parties. This restriction will take effect three years
after the CWC enters into force; during the interim, each State Party
must require an end-use certificate for' transfers of these chemicals to
states not party to the CWC. 8 Export restrictions of precursor chemicals
listed on Schedule 3 of the Annex on Chemicals apply only to transfers
made to states not party to the CWC. For these transfers, each State
Party must adopt measures to ensure that the transferred chemicals are
77. See generally CWC, supra note 24, art. VIII.
78. Id. art. I, 1 l(d).
79. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. VI, 1 2-3. If Schedule 1 chemicals are trans-
ferred to another State Party, they cannot be retransferred to a third State. Id. pt. VI, 14. "Not
less than 30 days before any transfer to another State Party both States Parties shall notify the
Technical Secretariat of the transfer." Id. pt. VI, 1 5. In addition,
[e]ach State Party shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding transfers
during the previous year. The declaration shall be submitted not later than 90 days
after the end of that year and shall for each Schedule I chemical that has been
transferred include the following information: (a) the chemical name, structural
formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned; and (b) the
quantity acquired from other States or transferred to other States Parties. For each
transfer the quantity, recipient and purpose shall be included.
Id. pt. VI, 1 6.
80. Id. pt. VII, I 31-32.
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only used for purposes not prohibited under the CWC and obtain a
certificate to this effect from the receiving state.8 States Parties must
also "review their existing national regulations in the field of trade in
chemicals in order to render them consistent with the object and purpose
of [the CWC]."82
4. Protection of Confidential Information
An impressive CWC innovation is the attention given to protection
of confidential information.83 The CWC's Confidentiality Annex pre-
serves a State Party's interest in both national security information and
confidential business information, and balances it with the CWC's inter-
est in full disclosure and transparency.
a. Responsibilities of the OPCW
To protect confidential information, the OPCW will require only the
minimum amount of information necessary to carry out its responsibili-
ties. The CWC denotes information as confidential if: 1) the State Party
so designates it; or 2) in the Director-General's judgment, its unautho-
rized disclosure could cause damage to the State Party to which it refers
81. Id. pt. VIII, 26.
82. CWC, supra note 24, art. XI, I 2(e). Since 1985, the "Australia Group" has played
an important role in coordinating export controls on 54 chemicals and dual-use equipment
important to the development and spread of chemical weapons. Since the CWC's conclusion,
the 26 members of the Australia Group have agreed to review controls on exports to signatory
states. See AG Meeting Ponders Future of Chemical Controls, EXPORT CONTROL NEws, June
30, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File; Jessica E. Stem, Lethal Com-
pounds: The New Chemical Weapons Ban, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1994, at 32; Gary K.
Bertsch & Richard T. Cupitt, Nonproliferation in the 1990's: Enhancing International
Cooperation on Export Controls, WASH Q., Autumn 1993, at 53.
83. See Barry Kellman et al., Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Control Verifica-
tion Can Proceed Without Threatening Confidential Business Information, 36 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 71 (1995). The international chemical industry played an important role at the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) in CWC negotiations, recognizing early on that without the cooperation
and approval of the very industry to be regulated, the CWC would be difficult to implement.
The chemical industry's role in the negotiations was bolstered by the Government-Industry
Conference Against Chemical Weapons, held in Canberra, Australia in 1989, where chemical
trade associations representing 95% of the world's production capacity met with delegates and
CD diplomats from 60 nations and agreed that industry would actively work with govern-
ments to ban CW. In the United States, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)
advised U.S. negotiators as to the viewpoints of the American chemical industry - particular-
ly as to verification procedures needed to protect CBI. The CMA has supported a negotiated
ban on chemical weapons since 1978. See generally OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: EFFECT ON THE UNITED STATES
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, PUB. No. OTA-BP-ISC-io6, at 10 (1993); see also Kyle B. Olson, The
U.S. Chemical Industry Can Live with a Chemical Weapons Convention, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Nov. 1989, at 21; Industry Urges Quick Implementation of U.N. Chemical Weapons
Convention, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 79 (Jan. 20, 1993).
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(including private interests that the State Party represents) or to the
mechanisms implementing the CWC. The level of sensitivity of confi-
dential data is to be established based upon uniformly applied criteria
categorized in a classification system. 4
The Technical Secretariat is primarily responsible for protecting
confidential information and establishing a stringent regime governing
its handling. Toward this end, it must develop agreements and regula-
tions specifying information States Parties must provide. 5 Confidential
information will be securely stored at the OPCW or, in some cases, with
a State Party, 6 in a way that precludes the identification of the facility
to which the information pertains.87 Access to and handling of confiden-
tial information by employees of the OPCW will be strictly controlled
and its dissemination within the OPCW will be on a need-to-know basis.
CWC-related information will not be published or released but for
narrow exceptions. The Director-General, inspectors, and other staff
must not disclose any confidential information that they have acquired
in the course of their duties.88
b. Protection of Confidential Information During Inspections
Before conducting inspections, the OPCW and the State Party must
negotiate facility agreements for certain declared facilities that include
84. Confidentiality Annex, supra note 24, 1 2. The Technical Secretariat will evaluate
whether information contained in documents submitted by State Parties contains confidential
information. The OPCW has elaborated a draft confidentiality policy and a classification
system. See Expert Group on Confidentiality: First Interim Report, app., OPCW Doc. PC-
VI/B/WP.1 (Jan. 14, 1994) (Draft OPCW Policy on Confidentiality); Expert Group on
Confidentiality: Second Interim Report, Annex, OPCW Doc. PC-VI/BIWP.15 (Mar. 18, 1994)
(Draft OPCW Classification System for Confidential Information).
85. Confidentiality Annex, supra note 24, 1-2. Inspectors must request only that
information which is necessary to fulfill their mandate. They are also prohibited from making
records of information not related to CWC compliance. Id. 1 8.
86. A State Party that receives information from the OPCW, including another State
Party's data, must treat that information according to the level of confidentiality assigned by
the OPCW. If requested, a State Party must furnish details as to how it handles that informa-
tion. Data must be handled in accordance with the State Party's rights, CWC obligations, and
the requirements of the Confidentiality Annex. Id. 1 4.
87. Id. I 2(0. Such documents include: initial and annual reports and declarations,
general reports on verification activities and other information provided in compliance with
the CWC. The exceptions are: 1) general information on the implementation of the CWC; 2)
information released with the express consent of the State Party to which the information
refers; and 3) confidential information released by the OPCW pursuant to agreed procedures
which ensure that release only occurs in strict conformity with the needs of the CWC. Id.
(A)(2)(b-c).
88. Id. i 6-7. This obligation continues even after the end of their functions. Also, staff
members must sign individual secrecy agreements covering the period of their employment
and five years thereafter. Id. 1 9. The Preparatory Commission is currently drafting these
agreements.
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detailed and specific arrangements with regard to the following issues:
(a) areas of the facility to which the inspectors will be granted access;
(b) storage of confidential information on-site; (c) scope of inspection in
agreed areas; (d) taking and analysis of samples; (e) access to records;
and (f) use of instruments and continuous monitoring equipment.
During both routine and challenge inspections, a State Party may
indicate to the inspection team sensitive equipment, documentation, or
areas that are unrelated to the inspection's purpose.89 The inspection
team must consider the inspected State Party's proposals and must fully
respect procedures designed to protect sensitive installations and to
prevent the disclosure of confidential data. Once an inspection is com-
pleted, the report must contain only facts relevant to the CWC and must
be handled just as any other CWC confidential information. If sampling
is conducted during inspections, the Director-General is responsible for
the samples' security, integrity, preservation and confidentiality, and
must establish a stringent regime for their collection, handling, transport,
and analysis.'
c. Procedures in Case of a Breach of Confidentiality
The Director-General must establish procedures to follow in the
event of a breach or alleged breach of confidentiality. If the Director-
General justifiably believes that the obligation to protect confidential
information has been violated or if there has been an allegation to this
effect, he/she may investigate. States Parties must cooperate in any such
investigation. If a breach is established, a State Party must take "appro-
priate action." 9'
If staff members breach confidentiality, the Director-General must
impose appropriate punishment or discipline. In serious cases, the Direc-
tor-General may waive the employee's immunity from jurisdiction, but
the OPCW cannot be held liable for any breach of confidentiality com-
89. Id. 13.
90. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. II, I 56-57. The Director-General must also
certify the laboratories that perform analyses and oversee the standardization of procedures
and equipment at them. All samples must be accounted for, and unused samples returned to
the inspected State Party. Id.
91. Confidentiality Annex, supra note 24, U 18-21. It is an open question as to what
"appropriate action" might entail. The procedures to be followed in the event of a breach or
an alleged breach of confidentiality, and presumably the resulting responsibilities of the State
Parties, are to be developed by the Director-General and approved by the Conference of State
Parties. See Discussion Paper by the Executive Secretary: Issues Relating to the Breach or
Alleged Breach of Confidentiality, OPCW Doc. PC-VII/B/WP.I (May 4, 1994).
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mitted by its members. Where the OPCW and a State Party divulge
confidential information, an ad hoc Commission will settle the dispute.
92
5. Penal Consequences
Each State Party must enact penal legislation to prohibit legal and
natural persons in its territory or under its control from undertaking
CWC-prohibited activities.93 The term "prohibited activities" is unde-
fined, but presumably includes prohibitions against the development or
use of chemical weapons or riot control agents as a method of warfare.
Whether penal sanctions could apply to additional conduct, such as
producing Schedule 1 chemicals in excess of the CWC's limitations,
transferring chemicals to a state in contravention of the CWC's obliga-
tions, or obstructing verification activities is left for each State Party to
decide. Also left to each State Party to decide is the meaning of the
term "penal" as well as the penalties that might result from a violation.
States Parties must provide each other with the "appropriate form of
legal assistance." 9 With this obligation, the CWC unites principles of
international criminal and administrative law enforcement with arms
control. Using the various forms of legal assistance in criminal and
administrative matters, States Parties may be better able to investigate
suspected CWC violations. Because other States Parties will be required
to provide legal assistance, each will have access to information located
in other countries.
6. Mechanisms to Address Non-Compliance -
The United Nations' Role
In cases where the Executive Council has requested that a State
Party redress a situation and the State Party has failed to do so within
the specified time, the Executive Council is authorized to consult with
the States Parties involved. Failing that, the Conference may restrict or
suspend a State Party's rights and privileges under the CWC until it
conforms to its obligations. The CWC does not specify possible sanc-
tions for violations of specific obligations, giving flexibility to the
Conference to react as it deems appropriate in a specific case. A State
Party may not be deprived of its membership, however.
92. Id. ft 2.0-2.3. States Parties must assist in the investigation of an alleged breach and
assist in taking appropriate action if a breach is discovered. Id. 1 4. 1.
93. CWC, supra note 24, art. VII.
94. Id.
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Where the State Party's action threatens the object and purpose of
the Convention, collective measures may be recommended. This could
include withholding from the malefactor any relevant exports of chemi-
cals, technical equipment and scientific-technical know-how. Yet, the
prerogatives of the United Nations Security Council must be respected
as collective action may proceed only in conformity with international
law. The Conference may bring cases of particular gravity to the United
Nations, which presumably can respond in any way authorized by the
United Nations Charter.
95
II. RECORD KEEPING AND REPORTING
The NPT and CWC each establish, as the foundation of its respec-
tive verification regime, a system of data record keeping, accounting,
and reporting. 96 Each regime's regulatory system focuses on the pres-
ence of particular substances (nuclear material under the NPT and
"Scheduled" chemicals under the CWC). These regimes share significant
similarities, yet the differences are striking. Briefly stated, the NPT and
CWC record keeping and reporting schemes can be contrasted by the
following salient traits:
(1) The objective of the NPT record keeping and reporting scheme
is, relative to the CWC, to identify information in-depth, whereas
the objective of the CWC's scheme is to cover a greater breadth of
substances and activities. Accordingly, the NPT demands more
exact measurements of small quantities of material and more pre-
cisely specifies the mechanisms to meet those demands than the
CWC. But CWC record keeping and reporting requirements apply
to wider types and quantities of materials than the NPT.
(2) Because CWC-regulated chemicals have many legitimate appli-
cations, as compared to the fewer uses of nuclear material, CWC
record keeping and reporting requirements apply to a broader array
of facilities engaged in a multitude of industrial activities. Further-
more, the type of information about facilities, especially as to
95. See generally id. arts. XII, VIII, 9HI 2, 36; WALTER KRUTZSCH & RALF TRAPP, A
COMMENTARY ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 218-28 (1994).
96. It should be noted that each regime uses sources of information in addition to record
keeping and reporting, including publicly available information from the media, information
generally available to governments, information from international trade organizations, and
information obtained by States through national technical means and other intelligence
sources. See generally SAGS! Report, supra note 19. These types of information can contrib-
ute significantly to the overall verification effort and could be incorporated with the expanded
declarations that are developed in this section.
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design specifications, that must be reported under each regime is
different.
Both of these distinctions highlight the CWC's broad regulatory cover-
age, a notable departure from the NPT's focused band of coverage.
To strengthen safeguards, the IAEA is considering plans to apply
"expanded declarations."97 Initiatives regarding expanded declarations
promote the goal of achieving greater transparency in a State Party's
nuclear fuel cycle and related activities.98 Expanded declarations might
include: information on all nuclear materials (including ore concen-
trates); descriptions and locations of all nuclear-related production
facilities (including design information beyond that already provided);
information regarding training, research and development; and data
regarding manufacture, import, and export of certain equipment and
non-nuclear materials. 99
This section compares the CWC's declaration scheme to that of the
IAEA. It describes the record keeping and reporting requirements of
each treaty and explains the reasons for their similarities and differences.
This section then offers options for expanded declarations as to materi-
als or technologies not currently declarable.
97. Parts of this plan have already been implemented (including Board of Governors
decisions regarding the early provision of design information and a voluntary reporting
scheme), which provide some guidance as to the types of information States Parties might be
required to declare. A model declaration has been developed, and the IAEA Secretariat is
using it in preparatory consultations with States Parties that are hosting field trials. Three
States Parties have submitted further suggestions on an expanded declaration scheme. See
IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17, supra note 19, at 19-20; see also SAGS! Report, supra note
19, at 111-4, 1 16 (discussing the related issue of transparency of facility operations).
98. Two important principles support an expanded declarations scheme. First, materials
and activities would be declared without regard to their location or whether operations are
conducted by governments or the private sector. Second, declarations would be updated
regularly and include a statement as to future activities. RICHARD HOOPER, SAFEGUARDS
UNDER THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: A TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (1994).
99. See IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17, supra note 19, at 18-19.
According to an August 1994 IAEA progress report on the program, an expanded
declaration should include information about all of a country's nuclear material, not
just any amount above the arbitrary limit set in the safeguards agreement. After all,
early weapons efforts typically produce amounts below those limits. The declara-
tion also should contain a description and the location of all nuclear-related pro-
cesses, production, research and development, and training sites. This would
include sites with no nuclear material.
Albright & O'Neill, supra note 8, at 25.
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A. NPT
Each NPT NNWS Party must accept safeguards for the exclu-
sive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other -
nuclear explosive devices .... The safeguards required by this
article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material
in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State,
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere."l°
1. Objectives and Relationship to Regime's Goals
The basic elements of the NPT safeguards system consist of:
1) requiring states to develop an accounting system for nuclear material
and to keep records accordingly; 2) requiring states to report regularly to
the IAEA concerning nuclear material, associated processes, and nuclear
facilities and design information; 3) installing monitoring equipment,
seals and other devices to prevent covert diversion; and 4) permitting
on-site inspections at safeguarded facilities to examine records and take
measurements at strategic points therein.
Safeguards enable the IAEA to detect diversion'"' of significant
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful activities at each declared
facility to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; the likelihood
of timely detection thus deters diversion. NPT safeguards also engender
confidence as to the nature of each state's nuclear activity and expedite
international cooperation concerning nuclear energy development."°
However, the NPT record keeping system was not designed to verify
compliance with the basic obligations in Articles I and II relating to
100. NPT, supra note 1, art. III(l). The IAEA Director-General has asserted that nuclear
material is subject to safeguards even if it is not declared. The IAEA's rights and obligations
under comprehensive safeguards agreements are not limited, therefore, by a state's declara-
tions concerning nuclear material and facilities. See MYRON KRATZER, THE NEGOTIATING
BACKGROUND AND INTENT OF SPECIAL INSPECTION PROCEDURES OF INFCIRC/153 (1992)
cited in GEORGE BUNN, DOES THE NPT REQUIRE ITS NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON MEMBERS TO
PERMIT INSPECTION BY THE IAEA OF NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN REPORT-
ED TO THE IAEA? 6 n.13 (Ctr. for Int'l Security & Arms Control Occasional Paper, 1992).
101. The term "diversion" means any use of safeguarded items in violation of any
condition of a safeguards agreement. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/26, 1 17.
102. See Lawrence Scheinman, Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing
World Order, SECURITY DIALOGUE, Dec. 1992, at 37.
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non-transfer and non-receipt of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices nor to detect clandestine production of nuclear weapons.' 3
2. Material Subject to Reporting and Methods of Reporting
NPT safeguards employ the technique of material accountancy:
collecting measurements of nuclear material at each facility that enable
the state and the IAEA to maintain a current picture of the materials'
location and movement and to verify that such materials are not
impermissibly diverted. Each NNWS State Party must establish and
maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear materi-
al.' 4 The IAEA then applies its safeguards, including independent
measurements, to verify the reports of the state's system.'0 5
NPT safeguards begin at the point where nuclear material is of
suitable composition and purity to be enriched in an isotope separation
plant or to be fabricated into fuel elements13 6 Materials "in mining or
ore processing activities" are specifically exempted from NPT safe-
guards. 1°7 According to one knowledgeable analyst:
The most serious limitation on the IAEA's safeguards is that they
apply only to registered material, that is, to material of which the
Agency is cognizant. These include material reported in an initial
inventory or imported (possibly notified by both the exporter and
the importer) or produced in registered and thus safeguarded facili-
ties. No matter how thorough and effective the Agency's controls
of these materials are, it is in principle possible for a state to have
an unregistered domestic source of nuclear material (i.e., a uranium
mine) and clandestine production facilities. It is also possible for a
state to receive unregistered material from non-parties to the NPT
103. See generally John M. Deutch, The New Nuclear Threat, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1992,
at 120, 122.
104. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 112 ("'Nuclear material' means any source or any
special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material
shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue.").
105. Id. 7.
106. See id. 34. This point may be as the material leaves a particular facility or as it
leaves a particular stage within a facility. The type of plant is not determinative; it is the
composition and purity of the material which govern the starting point of safeguards. Safe-
guards also begin when nuclear material suitable for enrichment or fuel fabrication, or any
other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into the
state. Therefore, any material which has not reached the stage where it is suitable for enrich-
ment or fuel fabrication is not subject to safeguards, unless the material is exported or
imported. MOHAMED I. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 725 (1980).
107. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 33.
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either for immediate use in weapons or for prior processing in
clandestine facilities." 8
Each facility is divided into material balance areas (MBA),'O and
the quantity of material in an MBA is determined. A book inventory of
that MBA may be maintained by recording measured flows into and out
of the area at appropriate key measurement points (KMP). The operator
takes a physical inventory of all material in the MBA, and a material
balance is constructed (i.e., all the nuclear material on hand in the MBA
is determined). These records may be verified by the IAEA;" 0 the
correspondence between the contents of the MBA on paper and these
records is the basis to judge whether any material is unaccounted for.
Material unaccounted for is then evaluated by statistical methods to
establish, with reasonable confidence, if significant losses or diversions
have occurred.'
Each NNWS must make periodic reports of safeguarded nuclear
material and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such
material to the IAEA."' The IAEA can require only the minimum
amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its safe-
guards responsibilities." 3 Two types of reports must be submitted to the
IAEA: accounting reports and special reports. Accounting reports must
correspond to the accounting records and must be submitted for each
material balance area." 4 Special reports are required, without delay, if:
108. Szasz, supra note 63, at 95.
109. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 1 110. A material balance area means an area inside or
outside a facility such that: (a) the quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of
each MBA can be determined; and (b) the physical inventory of nuclear material in each
MBA can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures. An MBA
is constructed or laid out so as to make it possible to measure, count or otherwise determine
every movement of nuclear material into or out of it, as well as all nuclear material held
within it. Typical MBAs are the store of fresh fuel, the bay in which spent fuel is stored, and
the core of reactor.
110. The IAEA verifies the plant operator's accounting by a combination of measures,
including: (1) review and analysis of the reports, (2) comparison of the reports to the records,
(3) audit or examination of the records (to test for internal consistency), (4) independent
counting, identification, and measurement of selected items to check the correctness of the
records and reports, and (5) certain supporting activities such as observing the calibration and
functioning of the operator's measurement systems. MULLEN, supra note 46, at 21.
111. SHAKER, supra note 106, at 749.
112. The NPT system follows and measures (or verifies measurements of) the flow of
nuclear material in NNWS, not only within nuclear facilities but also from one facility to
another within each of these States or between two or more of these States. The system looks
at the entirety of the State's peaceful nuclear activities and not at isolated individual facilities.
Id. at 719.
113. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 1 8.
114. Id. in 62-67. These reports must be made at regular intervals or, in some cases, on
an ad hoc basis.
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1) any unusual incident leads the State Party to believe that there is
or may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, or
2) the containment has unexpectedly changed for that specified in
the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized remov-
al of nuclear material has become possible." 5
For all reports to the IAEA, the IAEA may request, and the State Party
must provide, "amplifications or clarifications of any report."
'"16
3. Facility Information
The NPT safeguards system and reporting requirements apply exact-
ingly if nuclear material is being produced, processed or used in any
nuclear facility, or is outside a facility, or if the facility is expected to
contain safeguarded nuclear material." 7 Less than one thousand facilities
fulfill this definition. The IAEA is considering a broader declaration
encompassing a larger number of facilities that would include "a de-
scription and the location of all nuclear related processes, production,
research and development and training.""'
The IAEA is empowered to examine each safeguarded facility's
design to ensure that it will not be used for any military purposes." 9
However, safeguards agreements have not implemented this power
except to require that the IAEA be notified of the design of the facilities
to be safeguarded so that it can determine what control measures are
required and how to carry out its functions.' 20 Yet, even that information
need not be transmitted if it is commercially sensitive and is available
for examination in the state concerned.' 2' A requirement for states to




117. Id. 1 106. "'Facility' means: (a) a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a
fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage
installation; or (b) any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective
kilogram is customarily used."
118. IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17, supra note 19, at 19.
119. IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. XII(A)(I).
120. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and
1968), at Tf 30-32, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2; see generally Szasz, supra note 63, at
99.
121. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 8, 42-43, 46.
122. IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17, supra note 19, at 13; see also Iraq's Nuclear Weap-
ons Capability and IAEA Inspections in Iraq: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Europe
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One identified problem as to design information concerns the timing
of its submission. Currently, information about a new facility must be
provided at least 180 days before nuclear material is introduced, but this
timeframe might be inadequate. Earlier submission of information,
perhaps when a decision is made to construct a facility or when con-
struction begins, would enable the IAEA to: create confidence in the
facility's peaceful purpose, simplify safeguards implementation, carry
out safeguards research, undertake budgetary planning, and schedule
actions to be taken jointly with the state and the facility operator.
123
4. Import-Export Activity
NPT Article 111(2) applies IAEA safeguards to nuclear materials
exports. No State Party may provide to a NNWS, including NPT non-
parties, any special fissionable material or equipment specifically de-
signed for processing or producing special fissionable material, unless
that material or equipment is subject to IAEA safeguards. 24 Advance
notifications to the IAEA are required of any exported safeguarded
nuclear material to enable the IAEA to identify and, if possible, verify
the quantity and composition of the exported material and, if desired or
requested, to affix seals when it has been prepared for shipping.'25
Similarly, advance notification of imported nuclear material that is
& the Middle East, the Subcomm. on Economic Policy, Trade & Environment, and the
Subcomm. on International Security, International Organizations & Human Rights of the
House Foreign Affairs Comm., 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (statement of Robert Gallucci,
Asst. Sec. of State for Politico-Military Aff.) ("The board has strengthened obligations to
provide notice and early submission of design information on new nuclear facilities or
changes to existing facilities.").
123. Experience has demonstrated that much earlier notification to the IAEA is needed
both to enhance knowledge and to reinforce confidence. Unreported construction of nuclear
facilities raises suspicion and notification should occur no later than the time construction
begins. Lawrence Scheinman, Safeguards: New Threats and New Expectations, DISARMAMENT
(1992); see also Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Safeguards in the 1990s, at
17, IAEA Doc. IAEAIPI/A38E (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter Against the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons]; J. CHRISTIAN KESSLER, VERIFYING NON-PROLIFERATION TREATIES: OBLIGATION,
PROCESS, AND SOVEREIGNTY 52 (National Defense University/National War College Mono-
graph, 1994); Lennon, supra note 28, at 210 ("voluntary reporting of installation plans and
early design information has been encouraged by the IAEA with the intention of improving
the capability of the agency to verify those installations by establishing a more accurate 'base-
line' from which measurements could be taken.").
124. NPT, supra note 1, art. 111(2). This provision potentially discriminates in favor of
nonmember states because NNWS Parties must accept safeguards on all of their peaceful
nuclear activities whereas states that have not entered the NPT may receive nuclear materials
if they have concluded a safeguards agreement governing specific projects or facilities, but
not their entire program. See Harald Mller, The Future of the NPT: Modifications to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime, 14 HARV. INT'L REV. 10, 10-12 (1992).
125. Subsequent notification might also be required to indicate the receipt of nuclear
material. INFCIRC/153, supra note I, IN 92-95.
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required to be safeguarded enables the IAEA to verify the quantity and
composition of the material at the time it is received.
126
To supplement safeguards agreements, states are encouraged to
voluntarily report their import and export activities. For instance, a state
can provide additional information on its imports, exports and produc-
tion of nuclear material which can be correlated with its declared nucle-
ar activities and its accounting reports. The IAEA Board of Governors
has also invited states to report all exports and imports of trigger list
equipment and non-nuclear material used in the nuclear industry. Most
exports of these items can be reported to the IAEA as a function of a
state's export control laws. Reports of exports can subsequently be
correlated with information about the importing state's declared nuclear
program.'27 Exporters, however, are not obliged to report transfers of
dual-use nuclear equipment.
B. CWC
In contrast to the NPT's strictly limited yet intense scheme of regu-
lation, the CWC throws a far more pervasive net over the chemical
activities that it regulates. Like the NPT, the CWC only regulates facili-
ties that produce, process, or consume chemicals listed on its schedules.
But, under CWC "declaration" requirements, States Parties must main-
tain records and make reports as to many more substances and types of
facilities than the NPT.
1. Objectives and Relationship to Regime's Goals
The approach to controlling chemical weapons proliferation differs
from the NPT's approach to nuclear proliferation. Whereas controlling
nuclear proliferation is based on a tight accounting of nuclear materials,
chemical weapons control cannot successfully adopt a similar strategy
because chemical weapons are typically derived from substances that are
used by legitimate commercial facilities. 2 The, existence of dynamic
and diversified global chemical industries, whose production may be
readily converted to lethal CW agents, requires more extensive verifica-
tion procedures than those for nuclear weapons.
126. An exception to these requirements applies to transfers of nuclear material among
states covered by the Euratom Agreement. See SHAKER, supra note 106, at 732-33.
127. See SAGS! Report, supra note 19, at 11-4.; Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,
supra note 123, at 17-18.
128. Jay Brin, Ending the Scourge of Chemical Weapons, TECH. REV., Apr. 1993, at 32,
35 (observing that many legitimate commercial chemicals are the same as those used to make
toxic warfare agents).
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2. Material Subject to Reporting and Methods of Reporting
To imitate the NPT-style materials accounting would be very expen-
sive and impractical in the chemical context. Therefore, the CWC decla-
rations scheme has a broader scope, but is not nearly so exacting.
2 9
Within 30 days after the CWC enters into force, each State Party must
submit an initial declaration on chemical weapons' 3° and on scheduled
chemicals and "other" facilities.'3 ' Thereafter, each State Party must
make annual declarations regarding relevant chemicals and facilities.
132
These initial and annual declarations form the basis of the system to
verify that neither the state nor its citizens are engaged in CWC-prohib-
ited activities.
The information to be declared varies with the schedule triggering
the declaration. As to Schedule I chemicals and related facilities, de-
tailed, site specific information must be provided that approaches the
precision of NPT reporting requirements. 33 While less data must be
provided about Schedule 2 chemicals, and even less about Schedule 3
chemicals, these declaration requirements will generate a broad informa-
tion base to track the key components of weapons agents. For example,
declarations regarding Schedule 2 chemicals and related facilities focus
on aggregate national data and must (a) identify the chemical, (b) speci-
fy the quantity produced, processed, consumed, imported, and exported,
and (c) indicate the purposes for the chemical including the final prod-
129. The CWC's goal of preventing development of a militarily significant chemical
weapons capability makes allowance for the fact that small quantities of toxic chemicals may
not be monitored with precision. Barbara H. Rosenberg, A New Approach for Limiting Chemi-
cal Weapons?, ORBIs, Fall 1992, at 604.
130. Regardless of whether a State Party possesses chemical weapons, it must make a
series of initial declarations within thirty days after the CWC enters into force for it regarding
chemical weapons, old or abandoned chemical weapons, chemical weapons production
facilities, various other facilities, and riot control agents. As to some of these items, the
declarations must trace the State Party's activities back to 1 January 1946. If a State Party
declares that it owns or possesses either chemical weapons or any chemical weapons produc-
tion facility, its declarations must also provide its general plan for their destruction.
131. CWC, supra note 24, art. VI, Ifl 3-6.
132. Id. art. VI, in 7-8. For more current detail regarding declarations, see Initial Report,
supra note 76.
133. Initial and annual declarations must identify and quantify each Schedule 1 chemical
produced, acquired, consumed or stored. Annual declarations must include detailed informa-
tion regarding the past year's activities and must be submitted not later than 90 days after the
end of that year. Furthermore, annual declarations regarding the projected activities and
anticipated production for the coming year must be made not less than 90 days before the
beginning of that year. Each State Party must notify the OPCW of planned changes related to
its initial declaration within 180 days before changes take place. Verification Annex, supra
note 24, pt. VI, I[ 13-20.
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uct types."3 Schedule 3 declarations require identification of plant sites
producing each Schedule 3 chemical, and must specify the approximate
amount of production of the chemical and the purposes for which it was
or will be produced.'35 Declarations for "other" facilities must list those
facilities and include the approximate aggregate amount of production of
"unscheduled discrete organic chemicals" in the previous calendar year
expressed in specified ranges.
36
3. Facility Information
Similar to the NPT, facilities that must make declarations, and
therefore are subject to CWC inspections, are determined solely by the
presence of declarable materials. There is no independent selection of
inspectable facilities based on equipment contained therein. But in
striking contrast to the NPT, the large quantity and variability of Sched-
uled chemicals appreciably inflates the number of facilities that must
make declarations. It is estimated that these requirements will apply to
approximately 25,000 commercial facilities worldwide.'
37
Declarations with regard to each Schedule 1 chemical facility re-
quire a detailed description of the facility, including equipment invento-
ry, detailed diagrams, and the volume of the reaction vessels in the
production lines. Information and detailed diagrams must also be provid-
ed concerning any anticipated changes at the facility with respect to
134. Declarations of Schedule 2 chemicals are of three types. First, initial and annual
declarations must be provided including aggregate national data for the previous calendar
year. Second, initial and annual declarations are required for all plant sites that produced,
processed or consumed more than the threshold amounts of Schedule 2 chemicals during any
of the previous three years or is anticipated to do so in the next calendar year. Third, declara-
tions must be submitted of all plant sites that produced at any time since 1 January 1946 a
Schedule 2 chemical for chemical weapons purposes. In addition to identifying the chemicals
produced and the plant site, information must be provided that identifies when the chemical
was produced and where it was delivered. The deadline for initial declarations is not later
than 30 days after the CWC enters into force for that State Party; for annual declarations, not
later than 90 days-after the end of the previous calendar year, annual declarations on antici-
pated activities must be submitted not later than 60 days before the beginning of the follow-
ing calendar year. Id. pt. VII, If 1-9.
135. Identical to Schedule 2 chemicals and with the same deadlines, initial and annual
declarations of Schedule 3 chemicals and related facilities must include aggregate national
data for the previous calendar year's activities. Initial and annual declarations are required for
all plant sites that produced during the previous calendar year or are anticipated to produce in
the next calendar year more than 30 tonnes of a Schedule 3 chemical. Finally, declarations
must be submitted for all plant sites that produced at any time since I January 1946 a
Schedule 3 chemical for chemical weapons purposes. Id. pt. VIII, It 1-2.
136. Id. pt. IX, 1-8.
137. See Brin, supra note 128, at 32, 35 (observing that these facilities produce, process,
or consume some 70,000 assorted chemicals comprising billions of tons of materials).
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equipment inventories. 38 For Schedule 2 chemicals, design information
is not required, but information must be provided that identifies the
owner and location of the plant site and, for each plant within the site,
its activities, its use of Schedule 2 chemicals, whether it is multi-pur-
pose, and its production capacity. 39
4. Import-Export Activity
The CWC restricts transfers of Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals.
Schedule 1 chemicals present the greatest risk to the CWC's objectives
and purposes and are most severely constrained. They may be trans-
ferred only to another CWC State Party and only for specific purposes;
they may not be retransferred. Both the transferring and the receiving
States Parties must notify the Technical Secretariat of each transfer at
least thirty days in advance. Furthermore, each State Party must make
annual declarations regarding transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals during
the previous year identifying the chemical and specifying the quantity,
recipient, and purpose
40
No specific notification requirements apply to transfers of Schedule
2, 3, or other chemicals or equipment. For Schedule 2 chemicals, initial
and annual declarations aggregate the total amount of imported and
exported chemicals.14 ' Initial and annual declarations of Schedule 3
chemicals must include aggregate national data for the previous year's
imports and exports. 42 For Schedule 2 chemicals 43 during the first three
years after entry into force, and for Schedule 3 chemicals," each State
Party that transfers such chemicals to a state not party to the CWC must
obtain from the recipient state a certificate pledging that they will not be
used for prohibited purposes nor re-transferred. The certificate expresses
the types and quantities of chemicals, their end uses, and the identities
of the end users.
C. Options to Strengthen NPT Verification
Despite the many similarities between NPT safeguards and CWC
declarations, these two record keeping and reporting schemes pursue
138. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. VI, If 13, 17.
139. Id. pt. VII, 6-7.
140. Id. pt. VI, 1[ 3-6.
141. Id. pt. VII, I (for aggregate national data); id. pt. VII, 1 8 (for each declared plant
site).
142. Id. pt. VII, I1.
143. Id. pt. VII, 1 31-32.
144. Id. pt. VIII,, I 26-27.
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different goals through distinguishable mechanisms. Each scheme has
distinct advantages for its unique non-proliferation task. The NPT identi-
fies critical points where nuclear material could be diverted to weapons
and employs a rigorous and highly specific accounting effort to detect
and deter such diversion. The CWC throws a far larger net over the
chemical industry so as to monitor many more substances and types of
facilities but with far less specificity or rigor.
As already acknowledged, the NPT safeguards system was not
designed to identify weapons-production activities that do not inyolve
safeguarded material. While it would be inappropriate to argue that the
CWC declaration scheme could replace NPT safeguards, the CWC sets
forth the possibility of a wider data reporting scheme to enhance trans-
parency which could augment detection of undeclared activities that
undermine control efforts. 145 Such a mechanism could provide more
information to the IAEA on a broader range of nuclear-related activi-
ties.14 As the IAEA has itself recently recognized:
The capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities
is in large measure dependent upon the information being made
available to it. IAEA inspectors . . . must be directed to specific
sites on the basis of information obtained by, or provided to, the
IAEA. More information on a State's nuclear programme, and the
proposed design of new plants, together with increased access for
IAEA inspectors to operating records and to all locations within
declared facilities, will contribute to greater confidence that nuclear




Increased transparency through expanded declarations would result in greater depth
of knowledge of the fuel cycle, its dynamics and its constituent facilities and
provide the opportunity to ascertain that the operation of facilities and the flow of
nuclear material therein are consistent with the declared design objective and
performance of the fuel cycle as a whole. The fundamental component of transpar-
ency would be a declaration by the State of the current status of its nuclear fuel
cycle and associated nuclear activities and the provision of timely notifications of
any planned changes in the number, purpose or mode of operation of the facilities
comprising the fuel cycle, planned transfers of nuclear material and equipment,
anticipated changes in the manner of usage of nuclear material and any other
changes in its nuclear programme. The declaration could also include training and
R&D activities, their locations and a specification regarding the manufacture and
export of certain equipment and non-nuclear materials.
SAGSI Report, supra note 19, at 9.
146. "It is foreseen that the scope of the declaration and subsequent notifications would
extend beyond the traditional confinement of nuclear material specifics and would be suffi-
ciently comprehensive to enable the Agency to assess the mutual consistency of information
received in respect of the entire nuclear programme." Id.
147. Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 123, at 16.
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The CWC's proposed declarations system will compile extensive
data on chemical activities so that the flow of potentially sensitive
materials can be systematically charted from a known baseline. The
IAEA could adopt, with reference to the CWC, an additional layer of
record keeping and reporting applicable to materials or equipment that
may be relevant to nuclear weapons production but are not currently
covered by NPT safeguards. Expanded declarations may be a method to
require NPT States to provide additional information related to nuclear
capabilities supplemental to declarations of safeguarded materials.
These declarations would provide additional transparency regarding
NNWS' nuclear activities and programs. By physically checking the
information qualitatively for both correctness and completeness, the
IAEA would have additional confidence that their efforts to trace those
materials are comprehensive and that the NPT was not being violated by
way of undeclared activities or sites. Furthermore, the CWC declarations
scheme may be more effective in generating information regarding
indigenous production which, if pursued as part of a clandestine weap-
ons operation, may never trigger safeguards.
The most far-reaching lesson from the CWC declarations system
would be to identify items relevant to a nuclear weapons capability
("nuclear-relevant items"), in addition to source or special fissionable
material, and require NPT States to submit reports on the quantities
used, applications, and their location. These reports need not be as
precise as material accountancy for safeguarded nuclear material, but
could entail requirements analogous to those applicable to Schedule 2
and 3 chemicals under the CWC. Arranging nuclear-relevant items on a
series of graduated schedules and requiring regular declarations about
them would generate considerable information as to activities "up-
stream" from where safeguards operate, thereby complicating clandestine
diversion. Furthermore, since routine inspections take place at facilities
possessing declarable items, increasing the breadth of reported informa-
tion would thereby increase the number of declared facilities which
would necessarily enlarge the routine inspection scheme, as discussed
below.
A useful methodology would place materials on sequential schedules
on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that first measures necessity of
production (an item's importance to a weapons capability accounting for
substitutes) and its exclusivity of use (probability that an item's produc-
tion is for a weapons-related purpose) and which then balances these
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two measurements against the costs of generating and evaluating data. 148
The most expansive system of declarations would seek information
about uranium mining and milling, 149 but this might be impractical.15°
It may be more relevant and efficient to expand a declarations
scheme to include critical dual-use technologies relevant to the nuclear
fuel cycle than to keep track of all nuclear materials.' 5 ' Focusing on the
significant component elements of these technologies could be a logical
and broadly inclusive basis for expanded declarations. For instance,
declarations could be required with regard to high performance dual-use
components and equipment relevant to the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as
components of enrichment and reprocessing technologies relevant to an
indigenous uranium mining and processing capability. The IAEA has
suggested, in this regard, the desirability of information concerning the
weight and size of the casks used in transporting irradiated fuel assem-
blies. 152 Further from the nuclear fuel cycle, but no less relevant to a
weapons capability, may be technologies associated with fashioning
bomb cores and triggers. One analyst suggests policing of sales of very
high speed rotors.
53
Alternatively, reporting requirements could focus on unique non-
fissile materials such as high-alloy stainless-steel sheet and tubing or
storage vessels or valves that can resist corrosion due to radioactivity.
54
148. Kellman, supra note 11, at 825 (1994).
149. Neither plutonium nor uranium-235 exists naturally in weapons-usable form.
Plutonium may only be fabricated from uranium-238 in a nuclear reactor. Uranium-235 must
be separated from natural uranium, most of which is uranium-238. Uranium enrichment raises
the concentration of uranium-235 from approximately 0.7%, for use in light water power
reactors to about 3%, and from there to as much as 93.5% for use in nuclear warheads.
LEONARD S. SPECTOR, GOING NUCLEAR 327-28 (1987).
150. Despite the impracticability of requiring information about mining and milling,
safeguards apply only to uranium that is of suitable composition and purity to be enriched in
an isotope separation plant or to be fabricated into fuel elements. By subjecting uranium that
has not yet reached such suitability to declarations, the possibility of clandestine diversion
before safeguards are applicable would be reduced. "One of the important possible diversion
scenarios for [a light water] reactor is the undeclared irradiation of natural or depleted
uranium, which is in addition to the possible diversion of declared fuel assemblies." SAGS!
Report, supra note 19, at III-10.
151. For a thorough discussion of the technologies and equipment that could be relevant
to detecting a nuclear weapons capability, see RICHARD R. PATERNOSTER, Los ALAMOS NAT'L
LAB., NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION INDICATORS AND OBSERVABLES 6 (1992); THOMAS
B. COCHRAN ET AL., U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION 125-35 (1987).
152. After irradiation in a reactor, the fuel/target elements must be cooled in water
storage pools to allow for the decay of short-lived fission products. This cooling time
typically takes place at a holding facility adjacent to the chemical extraction plant. Shipping
casks are required to transport the irradiated elements. See SAGS! Report, supra note 19, at
III-10 & 11.
153. FAINBERG, supra note 18, at 19.
154. PATERNOSTER, supra note 151, at 5.
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Accordingly, a reporting scheme that identifies other relevant materials
might be appropriate. For instance, nearly all nuclear production reactors
use deuterium (heavy water). 55 Additional declarations could apply to
lithium-6, cadmium, boron, or beryllium which have essential roles in
reactor processes.156 It might also be useful to demand reports of elec-
tricity consumption which could reveal clandestine operations.
157
Even without expanding the range of declarable materials, NPT
safeguards could require more information about currently safeguarded
materials and facilities including, analogous to CWC declarations,
broader statistical data on quantities used, data as to the identity of users
and the purposes for the material, and more comprehensive information
about the facility that uses or possesses the material. Analogously,
declarations with regard to imports and exports of nuclear materials
could be broadened to help address the threat resulting from internation-
al trade. 5 To implement some of these steps, the IAEA could track
more closely the inter-state transfer of materials and equipment included
on the Nuclear Supplier Group's "trigger list." This list includes sensi-
tive items whose declaration to the IAEA might improve the overall
effectiveness of safeguards and make the IAEA better able to assess and
deter proliferation threats.'59
III. ROUTINE INSPECTIONS
The CWC routine inspection scheme can guide efforts to strengthen
NPT verification of activities at currently safeguarded and newly-de-
clared facilities. Of paramount significance to this analysis is that the
CWC routine inspection scheme, relative to current NPT practices, is
both more far-reaching in terms of what sites are to be inspected, and
the CWC authorizes more potent inspection techniques.
The CWC's inspection scheme is more far-reaching than the NPT's
because the CWC's declaration requirements apply broadly to more
155. Deuterium is used to slow down neutrons so as to prevent nuclear reactions from
getting out of control. While some facilities accomplish this task with graphite, deuterium is
more compact and efficient. See generally COCHRAN, supra note 151, at 140-43.
156. See also HARALD MOLLER & R. KoKOSKI, THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY:
POLITICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROSPECTS AND DANGERS IN 199o 20-21 (1990). The
authors note that safeguarding beryllium and lithium would present various difficulties, but do
not comment on problems that may be associated with declaring their presence.
157. A full-scale program to manufacture nuclear material for a few bombs per year is
estimated to require up to 200-400 megawatts of power. FAINBERG, supra note 18, at 21.
158. See MOLLER & KOKOSKI, supra note 156, at 25-26.
159. See LEONARD S. SPECTOR & JACQUELINE R. SMITH, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT'L PEACE, NUCLEAR EXPORTS: THE CHALLENGE OF CONTROL (1990).
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facilities and demand more data about more areas within those facilities.
Like the CWC, the NPT subjects a facility to inspection if it possesses
declared materials. Thus, the number of facilities where the IAEA could
inspect may be expanded beyond those currently safeguarded by ex-
panding declaration requirements, as discussed in Section 3, and all
newly-declared facilities are subjected to on-site inspection. Further-
more, the IAEA could increase access within safeguarded facilities to
areas beyond identified strategic points by requiring submission of more
detail about additional facility operations. The crucial issue in this
regard is: on what basis will broader or more intrusive inspections be
triggered and how will facilities be selected for inspection?
Moreover, the CWC authorizes more potent inspection techniques to
detect useful information and vests inspectors with broader powers. With
reference to these enhanced capabilities, it may be possible to broaden
the scope of inspections of declared facilities and amplify their overall
efficacy by augmenting the IAEA's authority. The crucial issue in this
regard is: what additional powers are appropriate and what may be
inspected under this augmented power?
This section considers what guidance the CWC offers for (1) deter-
mining the frequency and intensity of inspections; and (2) strengthening
the effectiveness of inspections. Significant components of the CWC
routine inspection procedure with possible application to the NPT in-
clude:
• a "risk-based" approach to determine the frequency of inspections;
• streamlined procedures to designate inspectors, multiple entry/exit
visas, and broad privileges and immunities for CWC inspection
personnel;
• specified. pre-inspection procedures such as: designated points of
entry, provision for the use of non-scheduled aircraft, guaranteed
transit to the inspection site, and logistical support to accommodate
inspection personnel;
• clearly delineated inspection procedures, supplemented by an inspec-
tion manual and an inspection mandate with definitively authorized
rights of access within the inspected facility; and
* broad rights to gather additional information, such as: (a) access to
all relevant documents, (b) the ability to take photographs, (c) the
right to interview facility personnel, (d) the right to have facility
operations performed, and (e) the explicit right to undertake envi-
ronmental monitoring.
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A. Determining the Frequency and Intensity of Inspections
Expanding NPT record keeping and reporting requirements to paral-
lel the breadth of the CWC's declaration requirements would subject
many more facilities to inspection. Such expansion could drain resourc-
es: if all declared facilities are subject to routine inspections, the effort
would be both impractical and would risk diluting the regime's detection
capabilities as to undermine its efficacy. Therefore, implementing ex-
panded declarations demands a rational method of selecting facilities for
inspection - a method based on the risk they pose to the regime's
object and purpose.
1. NPT
The NPT provides that States Parties must permit ad hoc and rou-
tine inspections (as well as special inspections, discussed in Section IV)
to be carried out under the terms of their safeguards agreements. Ad hoc
inspections are intended to verify the information in the initial report on
safeguarded nuclear material, changes since the initial report, or the
quantity and composition of nuclear material transferred out of or into a
State Party. 16 The IAEA may make routine inspections to verify: a) that
reports are consistent with records; b) the location, identity, quantity,
and composition of all safeguarded nuclear material; and c) information
on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver
differences, and uncertainties in records.'
61
Under safeguards agreements, the number, intensity, and duration of
inspections must be kept to a minimum consistent with the IAEA's
responsibilities. The maximum frequency and intensity 162 of inspections
of specified categories of facilities is based on a formula that considers:
a) the quantity of nuclear material within or passing through such facili-
ties; b) the form of nuclear material; c) the effectiveness and reliability
of IAEA controls; d) the characteristics of the state's nuclear fuel cycle;
and e) the state's international interdependence. The formula determines
the expected "Maximum Routine Inspection Effort" (MRIE): the number
of inspections, or the number of person-days of inspection, per year
160. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 71.
161. Id. 172.
162. Intensity is measured in terms of the duration of the inspection and the number of
inspectors. When used in this Section, in reference to both the NPT and CWC, the term
"intensity" does not refer to the inspection procedures to be applied or the level of intrusive-
ness of the inspection.
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applied to each facility.163 The frequency of IAEA inspections is related
to "risk" in that the ease of using safeguarded material for a nuclear
weapon is considered. The IAEA typically specifies in Subsidiary Ar-
rangements its "Actual Routine Inspection Effort" (ARIE), which is
smaller than the MRIE.164
2. CWC
Following initial inspections to verify initial declarations and to help
develop an inspection plan, the Technical Secretariat will conduct rou-
tine inspections of declared chemical facilities (facilities that produce,
process, or consume Scheduled or specified quantities of "PSF" chemi-
cals)' 65 to verify that annual declarations are accurate. Routine inspec-
tions are intended to deter violations without hampering States Parties'
economic or technological development,' 66 and to compile sufficient
accurate information to permit a high degree of accord among States
Parties as to what specific conduct constitutes a violation. The precise
purpose of routine inspections depends on the chemicals at the inspected
facility. Inspections of Schedule 1 facilities will verify the accuracy of
declared quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals. 67 Schedule 2 facilities will
be inspected to determine that their activities comply with CWC obliga-
tions, that declarations are accurate, and that no Schedule 1 chemicals
are present.'" Inspections of Schedule 3 and "other" facilities will verify
the accuracy of declarations and the absence of Schedule I chemicals. 69
The CWC explicitly specifies how facilities with scheduled chemi-
cals are selected for inspection, as Well as the inspections' intensity.
Schedule 1 facilities must receive an initial inspection "promptly after
the facility is declared" to verify the accuracy of information already
provided, to render information to plan future verification activities, and
to assist in the elaboration of required facility agreements. 170 For Sched-
163. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 9H 78-81; see also Szasz, supra note 63, at 104. More
specific guidelines for each type of facility are contained in the "1991-1995 Safeguards
Criteria" of Nov. 21, 1990.
164. Some states, notably Japan and EURATOM states, have contended that the ARIE
figures constitute the real maximum. James F. Keeley, The International Atomic Energy
Agency and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS
183, 183-84 (E. Morris ed., 1991) (citing DAVID FISCHER & PAUL SZASZ, SAFEGUARDING
THE ATOM: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 61 (1985)); see also KEELEY, supra note 18.
165. CWC, supra note 24, art. VI, TI 3-6.
166. Id. art. VI, TI 10-11.
167. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. VI, l 21.
168. Id. pt. VII, 15.
169. Id. pts. VIII, 17, IX, 14.
170. Id. pt. III, TI 1-3.
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ule 1 facilities, the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of
subsequent inspections will be based on the facility's risk to the CWC's
object and purpose as determined by the relevant chemicals at the
facility, the facility's characteristics, and the nature of the activities
carried out there. 7 '
Since inspecting all Schedule 2 sites with a comparable level of
effort is impossible and some facilities pose a greater potential for
violation than others, the OPCW has elaborated additional risk-based
criteria to determine the frequency and intensity 'of inspections at these
facilities.' During initial inspections, 73 the risk the facility poses to the
CWC will be assessed in order to determine the frequency and intensity
of future inspections.' Additional factors, such as the facility's compli-
ance record, will be considered over time. 75 Under this approach, in-
spection frequency will be determined by the risk of the facility, accord-
ing to the relevant chemicals at the facility site, the characteristics of the
facility, and the activities carried out there.
76
Regarding chemicals at a facility, risk assessment is based on: (a)
toxicity of the scheduled chemicals handled there; (b) quantity of sched-
171. Id. pt. VI, 1 23 (for single small scale facilities); id. pt. VI, 30 ("other" Schedule
I facilities; rather than focusing on the relevant chemicals at the facility, the OPCW will
focus on the quantities of the chemicals produced).
172. Because of their reduced risk for "breakout" activities, Schedule 3 facilities are not
yet given the same attention. The Technical Secretariat must select these plant sites for
inspection on a random basis through "appropriate mechanisms" (such as specially designed
computer software) based on the following criteria: (a) equitable geographical distribution of
inspections; and (b) the information on the declared plant sites available to the Technical
Secretariat related to the relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant site, and the nature
of the activities carried out there. Id. pts. VII, 18, VIII, 14.
173. Within three years after the CWC's entry into force, each Schedule 2 plant site will
receive an initial inspection during which a draft facility agreement for the plant site will be
prepared unless the inspected State Party and the Technical Secretariat agree that it is not
needed. Facilities declared after this period will receive an initial inspection within one year
after production, processing, or consumption is first declared. Id. pt. VII. Schedule 3 facilities
will not receive initial inspections.
174. To help determine the frequency and intensity of subsequent routine inspections, the
OPCW has proposed that inspectors take the following criteria into account during the initial
inspection: (a) toxicity of the scheduled chemicals and the end products produced with it; (b)
quantity of the scheduled chemicals and their feedstock chemicals typically stored at the site;
(c) plant production capacity; and (c) capability and convertibility for initiating production,
storing and filling of toxic chemicals at the site. Id. pt. VII, 1 20; see also Initial Report,
supra note 76, app. A, stating that the initial inspection of a Schedule 2 facility shall, inter
alia, "undertake an initial assessment of the risk [the facility poses] to the object and purpose
of the CWC."
175. Expert Group on Chemical Industry Facilities: Third Report, annex at 10, OPCW
Doc. PC-VI/B/WP.2 (Jan. 28, 1994). Where the plant site undergoes significant changes that
change the risk assessment, information will be updated through subsequent inspection.
176. See Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. VII, i 18-20; Initial Report, supra note
76, at 22, 24.
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uled chemicals and their feed stocks stored at the site; (c) similarity of
chemicals at the facility to Schedule 1 chemicals, as well as their lethal
or incapacitating properties; and (d) whether the chemicals can be used
as precursors for the final production stage of a Schedule I chemical.
The factors to determine risk related to the characteristics of the
plant site include: (a) process area characteristics such as production
capacity, presence of equipment capable of handling highly toxic materi-
als, enclosed or hooded process equipment, and physical layout; (b)
personnel considerations such as background and experience; (c) consis-
tency of extant security measures with declared activities; (d) facility
location, e.g., isolation or proximity to military installations; (e) safety
equipment and procedures, particularly those related to protective cloth-
ing, decontamination equipment, and contamination treatment; (f) ease
of converting the facility to CW production, storage, or filling uses; and
(g) whether the facility is a dedicated multi-purpose facility.
The risk posed by the nature of activities carried out at the facility is
determined by: (a) whether scheduled chemicals are produced, pro-
cessed, or consumed there; and (b) which activities not related to de-
clared Schedule 2 chemicals actually take place at the facility.
The proposed risk-based approach will not form a rigid methodolo-
gy; the Technical Secretariat will interpret it on a state-by-state basis so
as to preclude the prediction of exactly when a facility will be inspected.
The applicability of these criteria to assess the risk of a CWC facility
could be mitigated by prevailing industrial practices; environmental,
health and safety legislation; and proximity to populations. States Parties
in different parts of the world will likely adhere to widely varying
standards, therefore the OPCW's risk-based assessment will consider the
applicable political, social, economic, and environmental contexts.
The consistency between a facility's declarations and the inspection
findings will be another factor to determine risk. Thus, perceived bad-
faith efforts in honoring inspection rights could be a factor to determine
inspection frequency and intensity. These criteria to determine inspection
particulars for facilities must be applied in the least intrusive manner
consistent with the overall verification objectives. In no event may the
Technical Secretariat choose a plant site to be routinely inspected more
than twice per calendar year."
177. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. VII, 't1 21-22. Likewise, no Schedule 3 site
will receive more than two routine inspections yearly. Id. pt. VIII, 15. A special formula
limits the selection of Schedule 3 facilities to be inspected. The combined number of inspec-
tions of Schedule 3 and "other" chemical production facilities will be the lower of 3 plus 5%
of the total number of such facilities declared by a State Party-or 20 inspections. Id. pt. VIII,
1 16.
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3. Options to Strengthen NPT Verification - Determining Frequency
and Intensity of Inspections
The NPT and the CWC share some criteria to choose facilities for
inspection. Each regime prioritizes the facilities that possess the most
material that is most critical to a weapons capability. Each regime
considers a facility's controls over that material. The difference between
the two regimes is that, under the CWC, the Technical Secretariat may
consider additional relevant factors. For example, to evaluate the plant
site's characteristics, the Technical Secretariat could evaluate the skills
and background of facility personnel or the facility's proximity to a
military installation. Also, special consideration will be given to whether
the facility is multi-purpose and whether it undertakes activities unrelat-
ed to declared chemicals. Finally, the CWC attempts to characterize the
State Party's stability, although the salience of this consideration is
questionable.
The CWC risk-based approach to determine inspection frequency
and intensity could be relevant to new NPT verification measures,
especially if more sites than those currently safeguarded are declared
under the expanded declaration scheme discussed in Section II. IAEA
inspections of facilities associated with expanded declarations (e.g.,
newly declared sites) could focus on capabilities that potentially indicate
a clandestine NPT violation. A risk-based assessment would consider the
presence of threshold quantities of declared substances (including safe-
guarded nuclear and other declared materials) and base the frequency
and intensity of inspections on whether their activities and characteris-
tics are multi-purpose and potentially relevant to a weapons program.
The key task is to develop criteria to select those facilities where an
inspection will provide important information as to a State Party's
nuclear program. A selection mechanism strictly linked to the quantity
of safeguarded material will not necessarily devote ample inspection re-
sources to sites that threaten an acute proliferation potential. While no
regime can or should target sites for inspection on a discriminatory basis
or in a manner designed to harass, adoption of broader selection criteria
can enable the IAEA to concentrate inspections on those facilities most
relevant to NPT verification objectives.
B. Strengthening the Effectiveness of Inspections
Increasing the overall effectiveness of inspections is an important
priority regardless of whether more sites are inspectable pursuant to an
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expanded verification scheme. 78 The CWC offers guidance in two
respects. First, it clarifies the treatment of inspectors and removes bu-
reaucratic and physical impediments to the performance of their duties.
Second, the CWC specifically authorizes broader inspection access,
allowing inspectors to pursue information with fewer restrictions and
making the inspection more probative.
1. Inspector Issues
Verification will be more effective if inspectors can enter states and
perform their duties with minimum impediment and maximum legal
protections. This is especially relevant if the State Party is, for whatever
reason, inhospitable. Therefore, the NPT and the CWC each have proce-
dures with regard to: (1) designating inspectors; (2) issuing visas; (3)
privileges and immunities; (4) providing amenities; and (5) entry and
transport to the site.
a. NPT
Designations. The IAEA must inform each State Party of any pro-
posed inspector, whom the State Party must accept or reject within 30
days. If the State Party accepts those persons, the Board of Governors
may designate them as inspectors. Upon a State Party's rejection, which
need not be explained, the Director-General must withdraw a designa-
tion and propose alternative designations.'79 If a State Party's repeated
refusals to accept a designation impedes inspections, the IAEA Director-
General may refer the matter to the Board of Governors with a "view to
appropriate action. ' ' s°
The designation of IAEA inspectors has presented difficulties to the
IAEA inspection regime. States frequently object to the designation of
inspectors on political grounds (e.g., because the inspector is a national
of a state that is not a party to the NPT or does not accept safeguards
itself). Additionally, states have limited the number of inspectors they will
178. In theory, at least, if expanded declarations result in a broader class of declared and
inspectable facilities, the approaches outlined below could be applied to these newly declared
facilities.
179. The Director-General must inform a State Party if he, either on his own initiative or
at the request of a State Party, withdraws the designation of an official as an inspector.
INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 1 85(d).
180. Id. 19. While the procedure for designating inspectors is the same for all types of
inspections, some additional rules apply to ad hoc inspections related to initial reports.
Inspectors must be designated within 30 days after entry into force of the national safeguards
agreement. If this cannot be accomplished, inspectors will be designated on a temporary basis.
Id. 85.
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accept at a given time or have objected due to language requirements."'
These objections, which are sometimes spurious, delay an already lengthy
designation process and allow states to exercise their right to reject
inspectors as a means to hamper IAEA inspection efforts.
182
Visas. The NPT regime does little to define how and when inspectors
are issued visas. A State Party must grant or renew, as quickly as possible,
required visas for each inspector designated for it.'83 While some States
Parties grant inspectors multiple-entry visas, other States Parties insist on
single-entry visas or grant visas on a "special case" basis only. Uncoopera-
tive States can exploit the irregular manner of granting IAEA inspectors
entry/exit visas, adding to the red tape and institutional hindrance of
timely and effective inspection.
Privileges & Immunities. The 1959 Agreement on the Privileges and
Immunities of the IAEA affords inspectors immunities only with respect
to official functions under a safeguards agreement.'84 Thus, inspectors
enjoy the normal immunities of other international officials, including
freedom from arrest and freedom from legal process for actions taken in
their official capacity. IAEA inspectors also enjoy the rights given to
"experts on a mission" such as freedom from seizure of baggage, invio-
lability of papers, and the right to communicate with the IAEA through
codes, couriers and sealed bags.
85
Amenities. Parties to the IAEA Statute may make available services,
equipment, and facilities to assist the IAEA in fulfilling its objectives
(which presumably includes safeguards activities).' 86 Additionally, if
inspectors require services available in the State Party in connection with
inspections, including the use of equipment, the State Party must facilitate
the "procurement" of such services and the use of such equipment by
inspectors. 87
181. FISCHER, supra note 18, at 93 n.25. Under simplified designation procedures included
in the Director-General's proposal to the Board of Governors in February 1988, State Parties
can waive their right to approve individual inspector designations and accept the Board's approv-
al of an inspector. However, not all State Parties have accepted these streamlined procedures.
182. The right to demand an inspector's withdrawal is likewise troublesome; this right could
be used to pressure, or even banish, especially inquisitive inspectors. Szasz, supra note 63, at
102.
183. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 186.
184. Id. 10. For states not party to the 1959 agreement, the privileges and immunities
to be extended should ensure that IAEA inspectors can discharge their functions under the
safeguards agreement.
185. Szasz, supra note 63, at 107.
186. IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. X.
187. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 88. States Parties will also be expected to provide
inspectors with appropriate equipment for carrying out inspections and with suitable accom-
modation and transport. The Agency's Inspectorate, Annex 1 6, IAEA Doc. GC(V)/INF/39 (Aug.
1074 [Vol. 16:1029
Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Entry. Neither the NPT, INFCRC/1 53, nor the IAEA Statute specifi-
cally address how an inspection team is to enter the inspected State Party,
including the possibility of using non-scheduled aircraft, or transit of
inspectors to the inspection site. However, a 1961 IAEA document
provides that IAEA inspectors must use points of entry and departure and
routes and modes of travel within the State Party as designated by it.'
b. CWC
Designation. Within 30 days after CWC entry into force, the Technical
Secretariat will inform States Parties of proposed inspectors. Each State
Party must acknowledge receipt of the list and accept or reject each
inspector but need not explain a rejection. A listed inspector will be
deemed designated unless objection is received within 30 days. A rejected
inspector may not participate in verification activities anywhere under a
non-accepting State Party's jurisdiction or control.8 9 However, a State
Party that is notified of an inspection may not remove any designated
inspector on that inspection team.
The Technical Secretariat will submit further proposals as necessary
to supplement the original list and to designate replacement personnel. The
State Party must accept enough designated inspectors to allow for their
availability and rotation. If, in the Director-General's opinion, the non-
acceptance of proposed inspectors hinders the Technical Secretariat's
duties, the Director-General must refer the issue to the Executive Council.
For challenge inspections, the Director-General must specially
designate inspectors from the list of those designated for routine inspec-
tions with due regard to selecting an inspection team on as wide a
geographical basis as possible. A national of the requesting State Party or
the inspected State Party cannot be a member of the inspection team. 9
Visas. Within 30 days of receipt of the inspectors list, each State Party
must provide multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas, valid for at least two
years, to enable each inspector to enter and to remain on its territory to
carry out inspections.' 9 '
Privileges & Immunities. Inspectors are to be accorded privileges and
immunities for the entire period they are on the inspected State Party's
28, 1961) [hereinafter The Agency's Inspectorate]. Apart from this reference to equipment,
"service" is an undefined term.
188. The Agency's Inspectorate, supra note 187, at Annex 5.
189. This discussion also applies to inspection assistants. Procedures for the designation
of inspectors are contained .in the Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. II, It 1-9.
190. Id. pt. X, 1-2.
191. Id. pt. II, I 10.
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territory, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the
exercise of official functions. 192 The CWC enumerates six privileges and
immunities pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
193
and two additional privileges not contained in the Vienna Convention 94
to which inspection personnel are entitled. Inspection team members "shall
not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit
on the territory of the inspected State Party or Host State,"' 95 and a State
Party has redress in the event of abuse. If the inspected State Party claims
an abuse of privileges and immunities, it and the Director-General will
consult to determine if an abuse has occurred and, if so, how to prevent
future abuses. The Director-General may expressly waive inspection team
members' immunity from jurisdiction if immunity would impede the
course of justice and that waiver will not prejudice CWC implementa-
tion.m"
Amenities. CWC inspectors must be provided with amenities during
their stay in the inspected State Party's territory including: communication
means, interpretation services, working space, lodging, meals and medical
care. 97 Additionally, the inspection team must be allowed to communicate
with the Technical Secretariat's headquarters using their own approved
communications equipment and codes. The inspection team may communi-
cate via two-way radio with personnel patrolling the perimeter and other
team members.9"
192. Id. pt. II, in 11, 15. A non-inspected State Party must accord the inspection team
privileges and immunities when transiting its territory and must also grant privileges and
immunities to the inspection team's papers, correspondence, samples, and equipment. Id. pt. II,
I 1 (c-d).
193. These are: 1. inviolability of diplomatic agents - no liability for arrest or detention,
and treatment with respect and prevention of any attack on his person, freedom or dignity; 2.
inviolability of premises of diplomatic agents including the private residence of a diplomatic
agent as well as the premises of the mission; 3. inviolability of papers and correspondence of
diplomatic agents; 4. inviolability of samples and approved equipment; 5. immunity of diplo-
matic agents in regard to criminal jurisdiction and immunity from civil and adminisfrative juris-
diction except in matters relating to: private immovable property, succession, and any
professional or commercial activity outside official functions; and 6. exemption from dues and
taxes, subject to certain exceptions. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. II, I 11; see also
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Apr. 18, 1961, arts. 29-31, 34, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
3240-42, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 110-14.
194. Exemption from customs duties or related charges, and currency and exchange
privileges. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. II, I I l(g-h).
195. Id. pt. II, I 1 l(i). Furthermore, they "shall be obligated to respect the laws and
regulations of the inspected State Party or host State and, to the extent that is consistent with
the inspection mandate, shall be obligated not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State."
Id. pt. II, 13.
196. Id. pt. II, 'ft 13-14.
197. Id. pt. I1, 26.
198. Id. pt. II, 44.
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Entry. The inspected State Party must ensure the inspection team's
immediate entry into its territory. If the timeliness of inspections is
important, but timely travel is impossible using scheduled commercial
transport, the inspection team may use OPCW aircraft. The inspected State
Party must provide certain amenities in that regard.'" The inspected State
Party must ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team and its equip-
ment and supplies to the inspection site(s) within 12 hours from its arrival
at the point of entry.2
c. Options to Strengthen NPT Verification - Empowering Inspectors
NPT inspections could be expedited if States Parties were required to
accept inspectors approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. 2° The CWC
process to designate inspectors is more streamlined than the NPT process.
A CWC State Party may object to an inspector only on a timely basis and
may not delay an inspection once noticed by objecting to a previously
designated inspector. 202 Similarly, with regard to visas, the CWC two-year
multiple entry/exit requirement, unlike the IAEA system where visas may
be single entry only, enables inspectors to travel freely to and from
inspected states; inspections can proceed without a State Party having
opportunities to create delays by intentionally refusing to issue visas. A
Board of Governors interpretation of INFCIRC/153 paragraph 86 to
mandate that States Parties issue multiple entry/exit and transit visas for
a fixed period of time (perhaps with a 2 year period as in the CWC) could
help address this concern) °3
While less immediately relevant to verifying compliance, the IAEA's
grant of only functional privileges and immunities might hinder the
effectiveness of inspections, particularly insofar as the inviolability of the
official premises and living quarters of IAEA inspectors is not guaranteed.
Without full diplomatic rights clearly spelled out, IAEA inspectors lack
complete security and confidence when they perform their duties in new
and uncertain circumstances. The CWC, in contrast, requires States Parties
199. Id. pt. II, I 22-25.
200. Id. pt. II, 1 35-36.
201. This procedure has been suggested by the Director-General and has been accepted
by about two fifths of those states receiving IAEA inspections. Consideration should be given
to allowing States with "sensitive" plants in its nuclear fuel cycle to retain the right to reject
inspectors. FISCHER, supra note 18, at 93, n.25. This is under consideration by the IAEA.
202. KRUTZSCH & TRAPp, supra note 95, at 301 n.9.
203. The Relevance of Certain Aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convention to Efforts
to Strengthen Agency Safeguards, United States Comments, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/680 (Feb.
1993) (presented to the US/EURATOM: Safeguards Technical Bilaterals. Washington, DC, July
26-27, 1993) [hereinafter United States Comments].
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to extend full diplomatic immunity to its inspectors and provides its
inspectors with greater privileges, going well beyond the functional
immunity accorded IAEA inspectors.
The inspection team also requires support from the inspected State to
carry out its duties. The CWC spells out precisely what support must be
given to the inspection team. While similar provisions are contained in
most, but not all, NPT Subsidiary Arrangements, the obligations concern-
ing amenities are more clearly expressed under the CWC than under
safeguards agreements or Subsidiary Arrangements.
The CWC also spells out in great detail how the OPCW may gain
entry into the inspected State Party, including requirements to designate
a point of entry and arrangements to use non-scheduled aircraft. By
comparison, INFCIRC/153 safeguards contain no explicit provisions on
these topics. The effectiveness of verification, especially short notice
verification, can be significantly enhanced by specifying that the inspec-
tion team will be able to enter the inspected state and reach the inspection
site safely and quickly. Moreover, obtaining States Parties' agreement in
advance to these measures reduces the likelihood that even uncooperative
states will use issues such as entry and transit to the inspect ion site to
undermine inspection efforts. Recent experiences in Iraq and other
inspections of recent NPT adherents have demonstrated the utility of such
provisions.2 4
Finally, that the CWC includes detailed requirements in its organic
instrument for entry and exit from the inspected State Party, transit to and
from the inspection site, and logistical arrangements for inspectors is
crucial. All CWC States Parties have agreed to these measures, and it can
be expected that these detailed measures in the treaty are the minimum
to be applied (subject only to minor modifications in facility agreements).
By contrast, the NPT, the IAEA Statute, and INFCIRC/153 do not contain
these detailed measures. The IAEA inspectorate is only entitled to
negotiate these measures on a bilateral basis, at the discretion of the state
to be inspected, and in light of the safeguards agreement with that state
(including provisions found in the general part of Subsidiary Arrangements
and the more detailed facility attachments). One option for the NPT,
therefore, is that any future agreement forming the legal basis for extended
verification measures could bind states to identical obligations with regard
to the inspectorate (See Section V below).
204. Id. at 3.
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2. Conduct of Inspections and Rights of Access
Inspections will be more effective if access to the site is streamlined
and inspectors' powers are clearly specified. Both the NPT and the CWC
address these matters, but CWC procedures are far more explicit. This
subsection discusses the NPT and CWC procedures as to: (1) notification,
(2) scope of access, and (3) environmental sampling.
a. NPT
Notification. The IAEA must notify a State Party prior to the
inspectors' arrival at facilities or material balance areas. 205 Some routine
inspections can be carried out without advance notice in accordance with
the principle of random sampling so long as the IAEA advises each State
Party of its general program of announced and unannounced inspections,
specifying the general period when inspections are foreseen. The IAEA
should carry out unannounced inspections so as to minimize practical
difficulties for facility operators and the State Party, and the State Party
must make every effort to facilitate the inspectors' task.2°6
Scope of Access. While the IAEA is addressing this issue, the current
scope of inspectors' access is limited. During ad hoc inspections, inspec-
tors have access to: a) any location where the initial report or later
inspections indicate that nuclear material is present, and b) to locations
identified by the State Party related to a transfer of nuclear material. 27 For
routine inspections, access is limited to the strategic points2 8 specified in
Subsidiary Arrangements and to records that must be kept under the
national safeguards agreement. If a State Party believes that IAEA access
should be limited due to unusual circumstances, it and the IAEA must
arrange for the IAEA to discharge its safeguards responsibilities.209 If
205. One week's notice is required for ad hoc inspections to verify initial reports or
subsequent changes. For ad hoc inspections related to transfers of nuclear material, the State
Party must receive at least 24 hours notice. At least 24 hours notice is required for routine
inspections and must include the names of inspectors and the facilities or material balance areas
outside facilities to be inspected. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 1 83(a-b).
206. Id. 84.
207. Id. 1 76. These rules of access apply until the strategic points are identified in
Subsidiary Arrangements. Id. IN 92(c), 95(c).
208. A strategic point is a location selected during examination of design information
where, under normal conditions and combined with information from all "strategic points" taken
together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures
is obtained and verified. A strategic point may include any location where key measurements
related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance are
executed. Id. 1 116.
209. Id. I 76(c-d).
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access to further information or locations is necessary, the State Party and
the IAEA may consult and, if necessary, invoke the process for special
inspections. 210 During all inspections, inspectors must neither hamper nor
delay the construction, commissioning, or operation of facilities, and must
not affect the safety of facilities.2 '
Access to documents is limited during all safeguards inspections:
IAEA inspectors may examine only accounting and operating records that
a State Party must keep. 2 The authority to take photographs is undefined;
no mention is made of photographic equipment, but inspectors may use
surveillance measures. 3 Current safeguards agreements do not explicitly
grant IAEA inspectors the right to interview facility personnel. However,
inspectors must be given access "at all times to all places and data and
to any person,21 4 and the State Party must "direct all such persons under
its control to co-operate fully with [IAEA] inspectors. '2 5 Whether these
rights of access may be interpreted to include interviews of facility
personnel is an open question, particularly in light of the more specific
inspection procedures contained in INFCIRC/153 and safeguards agree-
ments based on it.
Environmental Sampling. The objective of NPT sampling and analysis
is to confirm that a State Party has not diverted safeguarded nuclear
216material for purposes not allowed by the treaty. Sampling and analytical
tools, as practiced, have been predicated on the need to "confirm declara-
tions" and are used to determine the authenticity of a State Party's
declared nuclear material.1 7 NPT sampling has not been undertaken to
detect the presence of undeclared, clandestine nuclear material per se
because samples are generally collected inside material balance areas.1 s
210. Id. 77. In the past, the consultation process has resulted in the IAEA gaining access
only to areas of a facility to which the State Party consents.
211. Id. 187.
212. Id. I 74(a). IAEA inspectors may examine all records kept pursuant to INFCIRC/153.
Id. (H 51-58.
213. Id. I 74(d).
214. IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. XII(A)(6).
215. The Agency's Inspectorate. supra note 187, 1 9.
216. See generally IAEA SAFEGUARDS CRITERIA, 1991-1995 (1990) (on file with authors).
217. Nuclear safeguards sample collection and destructive analyses are usually conducted
for "bias defect testing," which is used to ensure (at the time the IAEA conducts physical
inventory and other verifications) that there have been no diversions involving the subtle
removal or substitution of nuclear material from safeguarded items. Bias defect testing requires
the most precise measurement techniques (e.g., mass spectrometry) to identify possible material
alteration.
218. An exception is found in the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). Under this IAEA
safeguards approach, limited-frequency, unannounced access is applied to gas centrifuge type
uranium enrichment plants. In addition to satisfying IAEA nuclear material accountancy
objectives, the HSP also provides an assurance of timely detection of the production of a
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NPT sample collection followed by off-site analysis has been permitted
only for specific locations within a material balance area of a declared
facility. The IAEA inspection team has not been permitted to collect
samples outside of these areas, although new measures are under discus-
sion.
b. CWC
The CWC specifies different notice periods for different types of
facilities. 2 9 Notice must provide information concerning: (a) type of
inspection; (b) point of entry to be used; (c) date and estimated time of
arrival at the point of entry; (d) means of arrival at the point of entry; (e)
site to be inspected; (f) names of inspectors and inspection assistants; and
(g) aircraft clearance for special flights, if appropriate.220
At the inspection site and before the start of the inspection, facility
representatives must brief the inspection team, with the aid of maps and
other documentation as appropriate, on the facility, the activities carried
out there, safety measures, and administrative and logistical arrangements
necessary for the inspection. This briefing must be kept to the minimum
time necessary and may not exceed three hours.22'
The CWC grants inspectors the right to unimpeded access to the
inspection site and to choose the items to be inspected.222 The inspection
team must have access to the areas of a Schedule 2 facility enumerated
in the facility agreement." 3 As a rule, access will include elements of the
significant quantity of uranium at an enrichment level higher than that declared. Thus, the HSP
considers the possibility of clandestine nuclear material production at centrifuge plants. See F.
Brown, The Hexapartite Safeguards Project, A Review by the Chairman, in 2 NUCLEAR
SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY 491, 491-503 (1983).
219. At least 24 hours notice is required for inspections of a Schedule 1 facility, including
the single small-scale facility. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. III, 17. For inspections
of Schedule 2 facilities, the inspected State Party must be notified at least 48 hours before the
arrival of the inspection team at the plant site to be inspected. Id. pt. VII, 30. Inspections of
Schedule 3 facilities, as well as "other" chemical production facilities, require that the inspected
State Party be notified at least 120 hours before the inspection team arrives at the inspection
site. Id. pts. VIII, (25), IX, 1 21.
220. Id. pt. II, in 31-34. The inspected State Party must acknowledge notification within
an hour of receiving it. If the inspected facility is located on another State Party's territory, both
State Parties must be simultaneously notified in accordance with the above procedures.
221. Id. pt. II, 37.
222. The inspection team's activities and rights of access are governed by the CWC, the
rules established by the OPCW, the Director-General's inspection manual, the inspection
mandate, and facility agreements concluded between State Parties and the OPCW. Taking into
account the guidelines developed and approved by the Conference of States Parties, the
Technical Secretariat must develop detailed procedures to conduct inspections for inclusion in
the inspection manual. Id. pt. II, IN 38-45.
223. The areas to be inspected may include: (a) areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are
delivered or stored; (b) areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants
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common infrastructure of the plant site directly associated with the
declared activities related to the Schedule 2 chemicals.224 While the
inspection will focus on the plant(s) having Schedule 2 chemicals, broader
access may be specified by the facility agreement for that plant site.225 The
facility agreement may also specify other areas at the plant site where, in
the case of anomalies, access may be granted using managed access
procedures.226 The scope of access within a Schedule 3 facility is virtually
identical except that there will be no facility agreement, unless requested
by the inspected State Party.227
The CWC also provides a mechanism to grant inspectors access,
during a routine inspection without having to resort to a challenge
inspection, to buildings or structures at the site that would not otherwise
be opened for verification. 28 If the inspection team requests access to
other parts of the facility not covered by the facility agreement in order
to clarify an ambiguity, the inspected State Party must provide information
prior to addition to the reaction vessels; (c) feed lines as appropriate from the areas referred to
above to the reaction vessels together with any associated valves, flow meters, etc.; (d) the
external aspect of the reaction vessels and ancillary. equipment; (e) lines from the reaction
vessels leading to long- or short-term storage or to equipment further processing the declared
Schedule 2 chemicals; (f) control equipment associated with any of the items under subpara-
graphs (a) to (e); (g) equipment and areas for waste and effluent handling; (h) equipment and
areas for disposition of chemicals not up to specification. Id. pt. VII, 1 28.
224. Initial Report, supra note 76, at 1.
225. If agreed in the facility agreement, inspectors may have access beyond the declared
Schedule 2 plant(s) and those elements of the common infrastructure of the plant associated with
them, including: (a) undeclared plants having Schedule 2 chemicals in quantities below
declaration thresholds; (b) plants at the plant site that have Schedule I chemicals below the
declaration thresholds; (c) plants at the plant site that have Schedule 3 chemicals below the
declaration thresholds; (d) plants at the plant site, linked with the declared Schedule 2 plant(s),
which by virtue of their technological design, production profile and relation to the declared
Schedule 2 plant may pose a risk to the object and purpose of the Convention. Id.
226. Id. The OPCW has elaborated model facility agreements for each type of declared
facility, and Section 7 of those model agreements covers the conduct of inspections. A generic
model facility agreement covers all declared facilities. Separate model provisions have been
drafted for various sections of the facility agreements. See GENERIC TEXT ELEMENTS FOR
MODEL FACILITY AGREEMENTS, supra note 76; DISCUSSION PAPER PREPARED BY THE
SECRETARIAT: FACILITY SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE MODEL FACILITY AGREEMENT FOR SINGLE
SMALL SCALE FACILITIES, SCHEDULE I FACILITIES, SCHEDULE 2 FACILITIES, AND SCHEDULE
3 FACILITIES, supra note 76.
227. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. VIII, 19.
228. This mechanism:
emerged rather late in the negotiations as a compromise between those States who
wanted to limit the inspection to the declared Schedule 2 plant only, and those who
wanted to avoid a situation in which an inspection team would, at larger plant sites,
have to "jump from island to island" closing its eyes to the rest, in fact the major
part, of the plant site.
WALTER KRUTZSCH & RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVEN-
TION 443 n.34 (1994).
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and grant access to the inspection team.229 In addition to these specific
measures, all CWC States Parties must, under Article VII, paragraph 7
"cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of all its functions and
in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat." Because
the Technical Secretariat is entrusted with carrying out the CWC's
verification measures,23 States Parties must assist the Technical Secretariat
in verifying compliance, which could presumably include providing access
to areas of declared facilities that raise ambiguities.
Inspectors may interview any facility personnel in the presence of the
inspected State Party's representatives to establish necessary facts. The
State Party can object to a question if it considers it irrelevant.23' The
inspection team may inspect documents and records that they deem
relevant to the conduct of their mission.232 Inspectors can also demand that
representatives of the inspected State Party or the inspected facility take
photographs.233 However, inspections should cause the least possible
inconvenience or disturbance to the State Party and the inspected facility.
Moreover, the inspection team must not operate the facility, must avoid
unnecessary interference or delay to its operation, and must avoid affecting
its safety.2
Environmental Sampling. Sample collection and chemical analysis
during CWC inspections have two major objectives related to treaty
compliance: (1) determination of the presence or absence of Scheduled
chemicals, and (2) confirmation of the type and amount of Scheduled
chemicals. Implicit in these objectives is the notion of verifying the
completeness of declarations. Sampling and analysis, accordingly, are
intended to confirm the absence of prohibited chemicals by testing for
229. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. VII, 25, explicitly invokes pt. II, '1 51, which
provides that if ambiguities regarding an object or building within the inspection site are not
resolved, the object or building can be photographed in order to clarify its purpose or function.
Issues that cannot be resolved will be brought to the attention of the Technical Secretariat, and
the ambiguity will be noted in the final inspection report.
230. CWC, supra note 24, art. VIII, 1 37.
231. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. II, 1 46. If the head of the inspection team
objects and states the question's relevance, the question will be provided in writing to the
inspected State Party for reply. The inspection team may note in that part of the inspection
report that deals with the inspected State Party's cooperation any refusal to permit interviews
or to allow questions to be answered and any explanations given. Id.
232. Id. pt. II, 1 47.
233. Id. pt. II, 1 48. The inspected State Party must make available the capability to take
instant development photographic prints. The inspection team will determine whether photo-
graphs conform to their request and, if not, the inspected State Party may be required to take
repeat photographs. Id.
234. If the inspection team considers it necessary, it may request the facility's designated
representative to carry out a particular operation. Id. pt. II, 140. See also CWC, supra note 24,
art. VI, 1 10.
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indications of noncompliance, such as traces of illicit chemicals or their
degradation products.
The Verification Annex outlines provisions for sample collection by
the Technical Secretariat during routine and challenge inspections.235
Amounts and identities of declared chemicals are to be checked; if the
identity cannot be confirmed by indirect means, the inspectors can request
that samples (either solid or liquid) be taken from bulk material and
analyses be performed. The inspection team itself does not have the right
to collect samples (unless so agreed in advance with the inspected State
Party); it can only direct the collection thereof by the inspected State
Party. This is to minimize the possibility that samples are collected for
purposes not directly relevant to treaty verification. The inspected State
Party may retain a portion of the original sample or may take a duplicate
sample.
Chemical analyses during inspections can be performed using facility
equipment, if inspectors supervise. 236 Alternatively, inspectors can conduct
analyses using inspection team equipment. 237 Ideally, CWC verification
equipment would be sensitive enough to identify Scheduled chemicals at
sufficiently low concentrations, while not revealing confidential informa-
tion not relevant to compliance (e.g., identification of non-Scheduled
chemicals such as catalysts or additives). 238 When analyzed on-site, the
State Party has the right to be present. If the inspection team deems
necessary, e.g., where on-site analysis is inconclusive, samples can be
taken off-site to designated laboratories for more definitive analysis. The
function of off-site laboratories will include analysis of authentic samples,
development of analytical methods (for both off- and on-site analysis),
preparation of reference compounds and standards, and training.
239
235. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. II, TI 52-58. More detailed procedures for
sampling and analysis to check for undeclared chemicals during initial inspection of Schedule
2 plants have been developed by the PTS. Initial Report, supra note 76, at 15.
236. Sample analysis is to be performed on-site where possible. Initial Report, supra note
76, at 15.
237. The Technical Secretariat may bring on-site whatever approved equipment it finds
necessary to fulfill its verification requirements. The Secretariat shall maintain a list of approved
equipment for use by the inspection team that meets defined technical specifications. Expert
Group on Equipment: Third Interim Report, OPCW Doc. PC-VI/B/WP.4 (Jan. 28, 1994). The
inspection team can make use of non-approved equipment at the inspection site if the inspected
State Party agrees.
238. Current equipment considered for CWC inspections includes non-destructive evaluation
gear (i.e., acoustic resonance spectrometer, ultrasonic pulse echo device, and isotopic neutral
activation spectrometer) and on-site analytical equipment (including gas chromatograph-mass
spectrometer, laser ranger finder, military agent detector kit, and infrared spectrometer). Id. at
20-22.
239. Id. at 10.
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c. Options to Strengthen NPT Verification - Conduct of Inspections
The notice required prior to inspecting a declared facility is similar
under both treaties; in fact, NPT routine inspections can be conducted with
less notice than most CWC routine inspections. Yet, two aspects of CWC
notification procedures deserve mention. First, the CWC stipulates what
information the notification must contain, which can expedite the entire
process, as well as notify the inspected state of what is to be inspected and
how that inspection will proceed. Second, the notice required prior to a
CWC routine inspection applies stricter notification requirements to the
most worrisome facilities. Thus, facilities that pose a greater threat to the
CWC's object and purpose, because they possess materials of greater risk,
will have significantly less time to prepare for an on-site inspection.
The CWC requires the inspected State Party to brief the inspection
team about the layout, activities, and other important information about
the facility so that the team will have enough information about the
facility to carry out an effective inspection. The NPT regime does not
explicitly provide for pre-inspection briefings. Their occurence is on an
ad hoc basis without legal obligation, which creates potential problems
for newly-declared sites.
The single greatest difference between the CWC and NPT routine
inspection schemes is the degree of access granted to inspectors and the
activities they can perform. For NPT safeguards inspections, IAEA
inspectors are not permitted free access to all locations within a facility,
but are strictly circumscribed by the strategic points identified and agreed
to in the Subsidiary Arrangements and facility attachments. While the right
to unimpeded access may be inferred from the IAEA Statute Article XII,
access to that degree has never been exercised. That the CWC authorizes
extensive access to facilities also offers the virtue of uniformity. The CWC
specifies the minimum degree of access to be provided as a matter of
right, and all States Parties must adhere to that standard. The NPT regime,
by contrast, leaves important questions of access to be resolved in
Subsidiary Arrangements and facility attachments; INFCIRC/153 only
vaguely discusses inspectors' rights of access. As a result, NPT inspection
procedures and scope of access vary among states; access beyond strategic
points is, in practice, both ad hoc and subject to bilateral accord.
Inspector access as contemplated under the CWC is more penetrating,
and therefore more likely to be effective, for four reasons. First, the CWC
compels unimpeded access to verify compliance unless a facility agree-
ment or managed access procedures narrow access. By contrast, the NPT
does not allow, within the treaty itself, for access beyond strategic points.
Second, while OPCW inspectors may not "free-lance" or "meander"
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throughout a facility, the CWC provides a lengthy list of inspectable
places, including the plant's common infrastructure. By contrast, IAEA
inspectors have to move from strategic point to strategic point, effectively
ignoring parts of a facility that may hold evidence of non-compliance.
Third, the CWC explicitly gives inspectors the right to interview
facility personnel, take photographs during inspections, have facility
operations performed, and obtain access to all documents that the in-
spection team deems relevant. While IAEA safeguards agreements neither
explicitly permit nor prohibit inspectors from performing these functions,
inspectors typically have not exercised them. Fourth, the CWC provides
a mechanism, within the routine inspection scheme, for the inspection
team to seek access beyond that provided in facility agreements. By
contrast, IAEA access beyond strategic points can be pursued only by
exiting the routine inspection scheme, entering consultations and, presum-
ably, invoking a special inspection.
New environmental sampling and analysis measures associated with
NPT extended access could provide important information relating to
detection of undeclared nuclear material, activities, or facilities. An IAEA
program for environmental sampling can benefit from several provisions
of the as yet untested CWC program. Detecting isotopic anomalies in
vegetation, sediment, water (particularly effluent related) and soil samples
collected from investigated sites represents a credible NPT monitoring
approach. Collecting samples from facility storage containers, process
lines, and plant hardware could also help detect clandestine nuclear
activities. An effective modality governing IAEA sampling would likely
include numerous provisions covering permissible inspection equipment,
sample collection, handling and transport, duplicate samples, disposition
of unused sample material, and quality assurance. The CWC and subsid-
iary documents contain many of these provisions.
Greater rights of access to information and locations within declared
sites would increase transparency and openness in country-wide safeguards
activities. Extended access to declared facilities should be viewed in
tandem with proposals for expanded declarations. Requirements to provide
additional information are nearly meaningless unless supported by on-site
inspections, both initial and periodic, to assess the verity of those declara-
tions. Thus, as with the CWC, the primary purpose of extended access
during routine inspections would be to verify the accuracy of declarations.
Proposals for extended access to declared sites should be consistent with,
if not defined by, the need to verify declared information.
IV. INSPECTIONS OF UNDECLARED ACTIVITIES AND FACILITIES
It may be necessary to investigate whether a site, declared or not, is
in compliance. The IAEA is considering approaches to extending the
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access of IAEA inspectors to enhance its ability to detect activities in
areas beyond strategic points within declared facilities and at facilities not
declared under safeguards agreements. Of principal concern to the IAEA
are two recognized shortcomings in its safeguards arrangements:
1) detecting declared nuclear facilities or material used to carry out
undeclared nuclear activities to. an extent not covered by current
safeguards activities; and
2) detecting undeclared nuclear material, facilities, or activities or an
undeclared nuclear fuel cycle entirely separate from a State Party's
declared facilities.?
The previous section's discussion of routine inspections considered
methods to detect activities by requiring inspections of newly declared
facilities (assuming adoption of a system of expanded declarations) or by
increasing the scope of inspection access at safeguarded facilities. It was
suggested that access could be extended by subjecting more facilities, and
more areas within facilities, to declaration and inspection requirements.
This section, by contrast, considers how access can be extended to
areas that are neither covered by current safeguards agreements nor
declared under a new and expanded reporting scheme. This section
discusses how investigation of non-compliance would require authority
to inspect "anywhere" or at least without regard to whether a site, or an
area within a site, is declared. Accordingly, SAGSI has explicitly recom-
mended consulting the CWC challenge inspection mechanism in order for
the IAEA to enter into agreements (ideally based upon a model arrange-
ment) with States Parties as to the limits of extended access." ' The
CWC's concept of managed access is particularly relevant since overly
broad access to undeclared facilities or areas might jeopardize confidential
business information (e.g., trade secrets or proprietary information) and
militarily sensitive information.242
A. NPT
There are two principal means to obtain access to unsafeguarded
facilities and activities. First, the IAEA could invoke its "special inspec-
tion" authority. There is controversy as to whether a broad interpretation
240. SAGSI Report, supra note 19, at 6.
241. Id. at 7.
242. Id. at 7, app. 1-9. "The basic regime for extended access should contain mechanisms
under which confidentiality can be protected." Government of Australia, "Extended Access"
Safeguards Inspections: An Informal Discussion Paper 5 (1993).
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of the IAEA's special inspection rights permits special inspections of
undeclared sites or whether States Parties may refuse to grant access to
these sites. Second, SAGSI has suggested that "extended access" inspec-
tions of undeclared sites and undeclared areas within declared sites be
implemented supplemental to the IAEA's right of special inspection.243
This approach, possibly pursuant to a new model arrangement between
the IAEA and States Parties, could proceed with less firm evidence of
non-compliance than required for special inspections.
1. Resolving Questions of Non-compliance under Current NPT
Safeguards: Special Inspections
Under the current NPT regime, the only way to obtain access beyond
strategic points in safeguarded facilities is through the special inspection
process. Inspections are considered "special" if they are conducted in
addition to the routine inspection schedule, or if they involve access to
information or locations beyond the access typically provided for routine
or ad hoc inspections.'" Comprehensive safeguards agreements permit the
IAEA to make special inspections: a) to verify the information contained
in special reports; or b) if the IAEA considers that information made
available by the State Party, including its explanations and information
obtained from routine inspections, is inadequate for the IAEA to fulfill
its responsibilities."
The Director-General has asserted, and the Board of Governors has
reaffirmed, that its special inspection rights under comprehensive safe-
guards agreements are not limited to declared nuclear material and
facilities; therefore, IAEA rights under safeguards agreements are not
limited by a state's declarations. 246 However, the special inspection
mechanism has never been used to gain access to undeclared nuclear
material, facilities, or locations. 7
The Director-General is authorized to determine the need for, and call
for, special inspections. A State Party may request the Board of Gover-
nors, under the Provisional Rules of Procedure, to consider any urgent
243. SAGS! Report, supra note 19, at 5.
244. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 77.
245. Id. 1 73.
246. See BUNN, supra note 100; Scheinman, supra note 102; see also INFCIRC/153, supra
note 1, 1 106(b) (defining a "facility" as "[a]ny location where nuclear material in amounts
greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used").
247. This authority has never been exercised because the IAEA has never been presented
with sufficiently specific information to suggest that a special inspection was needed. A special
inspection could be based on sources other than safeguards inspections. See Scheinman, supra
note 123, at 73-74 (describing the types of information that will be required).
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matter arising out of Article XII.A.6 of the IAEA Statute. Presumably, the
Board may then request the Director-General to initiate a special inspec-
tion." Notice for special inspections must be provided as "promptly as
possible" after the IAEA has consulted with the State Party as to the
degree of access.249
Access for special inspections will be as agreed to in consultations
between the State Party and the IAEA,250 and the IAEA can gain access
to areas of a facility only with the State Party's consent. Disagreements
over rights of access between the IAEA and the State Party are resolved
as are other disputes over the interpretation and application of safeguards
agreements. The State Party may request that the Board of Governors
consider a question arising out of a dispute (including disputes over
access). If the matter is not settled by negotiation or other agreed-to
means, either party may request that the dispute be submitted to an arbitral
tribunal - the decision of which is binding.25'
If urgent action by the State Party is essential to ensure that safe-
guarded materials have not been diverted, the Board may call upon the
State Party to "take the required action without delay," regardless of
whether the dispute settlement procedures described above have been
invoked.2 If the State Party still refuses, the Board of Governors may
find that the IAEA is "not able to verify that there has been no diversion,"
and report the matter to the United Nations Security Council and General
Assembly. 3 Additionally, the IAEA Board of Governors may (1) curtail
or suspend assistance, or (2) suspend the non-complying State Party from
the exercise of the privileges and rights of IAEA membership. 4
Some commentators have suggested that a State Party does not have
the right to refuse access for a special inspection. Accordingly, special
inspections may not be refused because the requirement to seek "agree-
ment with the State" cannot "be read as permitting a State to deny the
248. See PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, Rule 11 (c)
(on file with authors).
249. INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 1 83(b). Notification of arrival will usually be part of
the consultations. See id. 177.
250. Id. 77.
251. Id. 71 21-22.
252. Id. 18. If the Board determines that granting access to Agency inspectors to carry
out a special inspection was essential to establishing that there had been no diversion, the State
could possibly be required grant such access without delay.
253. IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. XII(C). These UN bodies will presumably be able
to take all measures available to them under the UN Charter, including finding that a State
Party's non-compliance is a threat to international peace and security and invoking appropriate
collective action under Chapter VII of the Charter. See Szasz, supra note 63, at 116.
254. IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. XII(C).
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Agency access to information or locations necessary for the Agency to
fulfill its obligations under the safeguards agreement but rather as recog-
nition of the practical necessity of working in cooperation with the
State. 255 Alternatively, states have an "obligation to satisfy the verification
authority that all material and facilities that should be reported and placed
under safeguards in fact have been., '256 This concept is supported by the
fact that refusal to grant access for special inspections triggers a dispute
resolution process where ultimate authority rests with the United Nations
Security Council.
2. "Extended Access" Inspections
SAGSI has elaborated a four step procedure to obtain "extended
access" based on the concept that the IAEA has or should have the power
to carry out extended. access inspections even if it does not request a
special inspection at undeclared facilities or at undeclared locations within
declared facilities. The four steps are:
Information gathering whereby the IAEA would attempt to
gather new types of information from various sources.257
Information evaluation whereby the IAEA would analyze
information on a continuing basis to search for indications of
undeclared facilities and activities.
255. See Lawrence Scheinman, The Current Status ofIAEA Safeguards in A NEw NUCLEAR
TRIAD: THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AND
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (David Fischer et a., eds., 1992).
256. Scheinman, supra note 102, at 44 n.15 (1992); see also INFCIRC/153, supra note
1, 1 3 ("The Agreement should provide that the Agency and the State shall co-operate to
facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for therein.").
257. This information could include: the results of environmental monitoring techniques;
publicly available information (including media reports); information on the import/export of
non-nuclear material and equipment; information on the import, export, and production of
nuclear material; safeguards and non-safeguards information already in the IAEA's possession;
and information provided by States Parties (including intelligence information and information
gathered by national technical means). Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 123,
at 17-18. For a complete discussion of the relevance of these types of information or measures,
see SAGS! Report, supra note 19, app. 1I; see also IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17, supra note
19, at 24-25 (describing "Programme 93+2" Task 5 and procedures for identifying and
evaluating potential information sources).
"Clarifying the authority for special inspections is one thing; having the information upon
which to predicate a call for such an inspection is another." Scheinman, supra note 102, at 44.
Recognizing this fact, the IAEA has already established formal procedures to obtain information
about suspect activities in NPT State Parties (including a special office to receive intelligence
from states, setting up a database of published reports on undeclared activities, and systematical-
ly collecting the "observations" of IAEA inspectors). Correspondence: The IAEA and Its Special




Consultations with the State whereby the IAEA would seek
clarification from the State to resolve anomalies, inconsistencies with
reports, or other possible indications of non-compliance.25 The State
Party could clarify or explain the inconsistency without implying a
right to refuse extended access.
259
Site Inspection whereby the IAEA could obtain extended access
based on procedures elaborated in arrangements with the State or
some other legal mechanism, under two types of scenarios:
1) extended access to all facilities, both declared and undeclared,
on a random, unpredictable, and possibly short notice basis. There
would be no suspicion associated with these inspections;
26
and
2) if consultations fail and the IAEA decides not to request a
suspicion-based, short notice extended access inspection of unde-
clared areas of a declared facility or an undeclared facility, the IAEA
can request a special inspection. Because this inspection would be
premised on a suspicion of non-compliance, it would be much closer
to CWC challenge inspections or NPT special inspections.
As to the first type of inspection, the IAEA would provide the state
with a reason for the inspection. One purpose for these inspections could
be "demonstrating the viability of, and thereby building confidence in, the
procedures and arrangements" for newly developed extended access
inspections. 26' To implement this approach, the IAEA would require the
discretion to decide which forms of data or information to verify as well
as the frequency and time of verification, thus making verification as
unpredictable as possible.262
258. See INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 77. These consultations would be separate from
the consultations required for special inspections under INFCIRC/153-type safeguards
agreements. Access to sensitive forms of information and access can also be negotiated between
the State Party and the IAEA.
259. SAGS! Report, supra note 19, app. 11-8. In SAGSI's estimation, if consultations would
negate the effectiveness of inspections, this step can be omitted. At the very least, there should
be a time limit for the consultation process so as not to unnecessarily delay the verification
process and afford violative states an opportunity to conceal their activities. GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA, supra note 242, at 4.
260. SAGSI has suggested that the IAEA consider making arrangements with States Parties
to implement these inspections.
261. See SAGS! Report, supra note 19, at 7, app. II-10.
262. "[C]ontrary to the traditional approach, where all verifications foreseen must, in fact,
be made, it would be up to the Agency to decide which verifications to perform among the
increased quantity of verifiable data." SAGSI Report, supra note 19, at app. 111-5. The
Government of Australia has criticized such random inspections, in the absence of suspicion,
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The second type of inspection would require consultation but would
be based on suspicion of non-compliance. If questions remain after
consultation, SAGSI recommends that the IAEA carry out inspections at
the source of the compliance concern. These inspections would differ from
NPT special inspections in that the IAEA would have obtained the State's
generic consent to access beyond that provided in comprehensive safe-
guards agreements. Access would be very broad, including all areas of a
declared facility as well as access to any site that might have nuclear
material.263 Evidence of undeclared activity, if found, would be reported
to the Board, presumably so that further action could be taken.
These inspections would differ from special inspections in three
significant ways: (1) inspection procedures should commence with short
notice to the State Party in order to prevent cleanup of the site or removal
of incriminating equipment; (2) states would not have the right to refuse
inspections aimed at resolving questions of possible non-compliance (i.e.,
undeclared activities); and (3) the grounds for seeking an inspection would
fall short of the evidence that would authorize a special inspection.2
B. The CWC Challenge Inspection Scheme
CWC challenge inspections are perhaps the most dynamic recent arms
control initiative. Article IX contains procedures to deal with compliance
problems. These procedures represent progressively stronger steps, up to
and including a challenge inspection, by which a State Party can resolve
doubts as to another State Party's non-compliance.
CWC challenge inspections are noteworthy in seven respects. First,
in addition to a consultative process to resolve a concern, any State Party
(not the OPCW) can request a challenge inspection; once requested, it
must proceed unless three-quarters of the Executive Council rejects the
request. Second, since a challenge inspection proceeds with regard to
"doubts about compliance," it insinuates suspicion. Third, the challenged
State Party cannot rightfully refuse an inspection, but limited exceptions
as "unproductive," expensive, and unlikely to uncover undeclared activities. GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA, supra note 242, at 3.
263. SAGSI Report, supra note 19, at app. 111-8. A different IAEA formulation for extended
access, described in IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17, supra note 19, at 19, asserts that increased
transparency, which will be tested in field trials, requires increased physical access and increased
access to information. Increased access does not involve "literally, 'any time, any place,' without
.notice" but does involve very broad access within and outside declared facilities and within other
locations identified in expanded declarations. Id.
264. SAGS! Report, supra note 19, at app. 11-8. The Australian Government has suggested
that a refusal to grant extended access be treated as grounds for a special inspection under




exist that may narrow its scope. Fourth, a challenge inspection can be of
any place, whether a declared facility or not. Fifth, CWC inspectors have
greater capabilities to carry out inspection activities, including explicit
authority to conduct environmental sampling. Sixth, an extensive modality
known as "managed access" protects confidential and sensitive informa-
tion. Seventh, and most significantly, the procedures to invoke and
conduct a challenge inspection, and the obligations on all involved parties,
are explicitly enumerated. The CWC regulates the following important
subjects: (a) designation of inspectors; (b) contents of the inspection
request; (c) methods to define the inspection site's perimeter, including
time frames; (d) securing the site, exit monitoring, perimeter activities; (e)
rights and obligations of the inspected State Party and the inspection team
with regard to access, including managed access; (f) duration of inspec-
tion; and (g) preparation of the final report.2 65
1. Requests for Clarification
If concerns arise about non-compliance, States Parties should try to
settle the problem through direct consultation and cooperation. Upon
request, each State Party must, within ten days, provide information to
satisfy another State Party's doubts about compliance. Any such efforts
to resolve doubts do not affect the requesting State Party's rights and
obligations, including the right to request a challenge inspection.2" A State
Party may also ask the Executive Council to obtain clarification from
another State Party by 1) forwarding the request to the relevant parties,
or 2) having the Director-General establish a group of experts. If doubts
remain, a State Party may request a special session of the Executive
Council to consider the matter and recommend appropriate measures. If,
after 60 days, the matter still has not been resolved, a State Party may
request a special session of the Conference of States Parties to recommend
measures to resolve the situation.26
2. Invoking Challenge Inspections
Each State Party may request an on-site challenge inspection, con-
ducted by an inspection team designated by the Director-General, of any
location in the territory or under the jurisdiction or control of another State
265. For a full list of the activities undertaken during a challenge inspection, see Initial
Report, supra note 76, att. I (Illustrative List of Activities in Challenge Inspection).
266. CWC, supra note 24, art. IX, '[ 2-3.
267. Id. art. IX, TI 3-7.
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Party.268 The right to request a challenge inspection is independent of the
above-discussed procedures for clarifying doubts through direct consulta-
tion and cooperation procedures. In significant contrast to the NPT,
therefore, a CWC State Party (not the OPCW) can initiate a challenge
inspection simply on the basis of its own doubts about another State
Party's compliance. The requesting State Party must keep its request
within the scope of the CWC and provide "all appropriate information on
the basis of which the concern has arisen, 269 including specification of
the CWC's relevant provisions and identification of the site to be inspect-
ed. The challenge inspection may be stopped only if three-quarters of the
Executive Council deem the request frivolous (the concerns are minor
irregularities or excessively technical), abusive (the concerns are artificial
or intended to harass), or clearly beyond the CWC's challenge inspection
provisions. 27" The requested State Party may not refuse the inspection.
3. Inspectors
The inspectors eligible for challenge inspections are those already
designated for routine inspections, thus avoiding additional financial
burden and offering the necessary qualification, experience, skill and
training. The Director-General will specially designate the identity and
number of inspectors for each challenge inspection. Nationals of the
requesting and the inspected State Party may not be inspectors. 27 ' The
requesting State Party may, however, send an observer if the inspected
State Party agrees. If the inspected State Party refuses, that fact must be
recorded in the final report. The observer will have the same rights of
arrival and access to the inspection site as the inspection team, and shall
be kept informed and make recommendations as to the conduct of the
inspection. In addition, the inspected State Party must provide necessary
amenities for the observer.272
4. Preparations for a Challenge Inspection
The Director-General must notify the inspected State Party and the
Executive Council of the inspection site's location not less than 12 hours
268. Id. art. IX, 1 8. Article IX conspicuously does not authorize the OPCW to invoke a
challenge inspection.
269. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. X, I 4(d).
270. CWC, supra note 24, art. IX, 117; see also KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 95, at
189-91.
271. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. X, 11 1-2.
272. CWC, supra note 24, art. IX, '112; Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. X,
11 53-56. The observer is also entitled to basically the same privileges and immunities as
members of the inspection team. Id. pt. II, 1 16.
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before the inspection team's planned arrival at the point of entry. The
requesting State Party must designate this site as specifically as possible
by providing a site diagram that specifies the requested perimeter.273 The
inspected State Party must transport the inspectors to the final perimeter
within 24 hours if the site is a declared facility or 36 hours if it is an
undeclared facility.274
If the inspected site is undeclared, the CWC contains an intricate pro-
cess to determine its final perimeter.275 Upon its arrival at the perimeter,
the inspection team may secure the site and begin perimeter activities,
including: identifying vehicular exits, making traffic logs, taking photo-
graphs, video-recording exits and exit traffic, using appropriate monitoring
instruments, taking samples, and conducting additional activities as agreed
with the inspected State Party. These procedures may continue for the
inspection's duration, but may not unreasonably hamper or delay the
facility's normal operation.276
5. Conduct of a Challenge Inspection
The inspected State Party must make every reasonable effort to
demonstrate its compliance with the CWC. To this end, it must provide
access within the perimeter on a managed access basis (as discussed
below) within 108 hours after the inspection team's arrival at the point
of entry. If requested, the inspected State Party may provide aerial access
to the inspection site.277 Following a safety and logistical briefing, the
inspection team must prepare an initial inspection plan.278
'The extent of access varies depending on the type of facility. For
declared facilities with facility agreements, access must be unimpeded
within the agreed boundaries. For declared facilities without facility
agreements, access will be negotiated according to the CWC's general
273. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. X, I 4-7, 10.
274. Id. pt. X, 9H 13-15.
275. The requesting State Party must specify the requested perimeter, subject to enumerated
conditions. If that perimeter is acceptable to the inspected State Party, it becomes the final
perimeter. If the inspected State Party objects, it may specify an alternative perimeter within
24 hours from the inspection team's arrival at the point of entry. The inspection team and the
inspected State Party will negotiate the final perimeter in two phases: at the point of entry and
at the alternative perimeter. If no agreement is reached within 72 hours of the arrival of the
inspection team at the site, the alternative perimeter will be designated as the final perimeter.
Id. pt. X, I 8, 16-21.
276. Id. pt. X, 23-31.
277. Id. pt. X, i 38-40. Aerial access complements ground access to the inspection site
and is not an alternative to it. KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 95, at 487.
278. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. X, T1 32-34.
Summer 1995] 1095
Michigan Journal of International Law
inspection guidelines. 279 Access must be granted to the greatest degree
"taking into account any constitutional obligations [the State Party] may
have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures."'2 80 Those
limitations may not be invoked to conceal evasion of CWC obligations
nor to engage in prohibited activities; if invoked, the inspected State Party
must make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to clarify
the non-compliance concern that generated the challenge inspection.
Procedures are expressly provided for collecting samples as are the
constraints associated with their analysis and disposition. At declared
facilities with facility agreements, sampling outside the final perimeter is
subject to managed access. The inspection team may request the inspected
State Party to collect samples from within the final perimeter in the
presence of inspectors, or the inspectors may collect samples directly if
the inspected State Party consents.28 ' Analysis of samples collected during
challenge inspections under managed access is restricted "to the presence
or absence of chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2, and 3 or appropriate
degradation products" that would indicate noncompliance.2 2 Under
provisions for securing the site and monitoring exits, inspectors may take
wipe, air, soil, and effluent samples outside the site.283 Sample analysis
and use of "chemical evidence equipment" are permitted as part of
monitoring vehicular traffic exiting the secured challenge inspection site.284
While challenge inspections are relatively unconstrained, the inspection
team may use only those methods necessary to provide sufficient relevant
facts to clarify the non-compliance concerns. The inspection team cannot
seek nor document information clearly unrelated to the compliance
concerns. It should conduct the inspection in the least intrusive manner
possible, proceeding to more intrusive procedures only as it deems
necessary. 5
279. Id. pt. X, 51.
280. Id. pt. X, 41.
281. Id. pt. 11,1 52.
282. Id. pt. X, 1 48(e).
283. Id. pts. II, I 52-58, X, 1 36.
284. Id. pt. X, I 24, 27. Entering traffic as well as personnel passenger vehicles exiting
the site cannot be monitored. Id. pt. X, 1 30. Part XI of the Annex, dealing with allegations of
use of chemical weapons, as with Part X on challenge inspections, permits sample taking,
including samples from environmental media of air, soil, vegetation, water, and snow. In
investigations of alleged use, the detailed procedures and protections associated with managed
access and delineation of a perimeter would not apply. Sample taking in alleged use, however,
would draw on the general inspection rules pertaining to sampling.
285. Id. pt. X, i 44-45.
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6. Protection of Confidential Information During Challenge
Inspections/Managed Access
"Managed access" is an important process to limit the scope of certain
activities performed during challenge inspections in order to protect
sensitive equipment, information, or areas unrelated to chemical weap-
ons.28 6 Accordingly, an inspected State Party may take measures necessary
to protect sensitive installations and prevent disclosure of confidential
information, including: (a) removal of sensitive papers from office spaces;
(b) shrouding sensitive displays, stores, and equipment; (c) shrouding
sensitive equipment, such as computer or electronic systems; (d) logging
off computer systems and turning off data indicating devices; (e) restric-
tion of sample analysis to detect the presence or absence of chemicals
listed in Schedules 1, 2, and 3 or appropriate degradation products; (f)
using random selective access techniques whereby the inspectors may
select a given percentage or number of buildings of their choice to inspect
- the same principle can apply to the interior and content of sensitive
buildings; and (g) in exceptional cases, giving only individual inspectors
access to certain parts of the inspection site."87
The inspected State Party must reasonably try to provide alternative
means to clarify the possible non-compliance that generated the challenge
inspection. Furthermore, it must reasonably try to demonstrate to the
inspection team that any object, building, structure, container, or vehicle
to which full access is not granted, or which is protected in the above
manner, is not used for purposes related to the non-compliance concerns.
This may be accomplished by means of, inter alia: (a) partial removal of
a shroud or environmental protection cover, at the discretion of the
inspected State Party; (b) a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed
space from its entrance; or (c) other methods. 8 Regardless of the
limitations negotiated at this stage, if the inspection team finds evidence
of non-compliance, it will not be bound to the managed access agree-
ment.2"9
7. Post-Inspection Activities
The inspection must not exceed 84 hours unless the inspected State
Party agrees to an extension. Upon completion of the inspection, the
286. Id. pt. X, 1 47.
287. Id. pt. X, 48.
288. Id. pt. X, In 49-50.
289. KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 95, at 491.
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inspection team and the observer must leave the inspected State Party's
territory in the minimum time possible. 290
The inspection team's report will summarize its activities and findings,
particularly with regard to the concerns regarding CWC non-compliance
that prompted the request. It must also assess the degree of access and
cooperation granted to them. A draft report, subject to the provisions of
the CWC Confidentiality Annex, will be circulated to the requesting State
Party, the Executive Council, and the inspected State Party. The inspected
State Party may identify information unrelated to chemical weapons that,
due to its confidentiality, should not be circulated outside the Technical
Secretariat. A final report is due within 30 days of the completion of the
challenge inspection.291
The Executive Council must then address whether any non-compliance
has occurred, whether the request has been within the scope of the CWC,
and whether the challenge inspection request was abusive. The Executive
Council may take further appropriate actions to ensure CWC compliance
or may make specific recommendations to the Conference. 292 The Confer-
ence will take the necessary measures, including restricting or suspending
a State Party's rights and privileges under the CWC, or may recommend
collective measures even to the point of referring the matter to the United
Nations.293
C. Options to Strengthen NPT Verification - Investigating
Non-Compliance
The CWC provides numerous options that the IAEA may wish to
exercise as part of its special inspection authority or include in a model
arrangement for extended access.
1. Explicit Consultation and Clarification Procedures
Providing an opportunity for a satisfactory diplomatic resolution of
a compliance concern is an important component of investigating compli-
ance. The CWC's consultation and clarification procedures permit States
Parties to address their differences, either bilaterally or with the OPCW's
help, before resorting to a challenge inspection. While the NPT allows for
290. Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. X, I 57-58.
291. CWC, supra note 24, art. IX, 21; Verification Annex, supra note 24, pt. X,
(H 59-61.
292. For instance, if the inspection request is subsequently deemed abusive, the Executive
Council will examine whether the requesting State Party should bear some of the inspection's
costs. CWC, supra note 24, art. IX, 'if 22-25.
293. Id. art. XII, Ti 2-4.
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a process of consultation for special inspections, the appropriate modalities
are not explicit, rendering that process less amenable to fact-finding than
the CWC process. The IAEA could allow States Parties and the IAEA to
address possible compliance concerns which might avert politically
damaging accusations and could provide an avenue for resolution without
the intrusion of special or extended access or inspections.
2. State Party Invocation of Inspections
The CWC empowers each State Party to call for a challenge inspection
on its own authority. In contrast to the IAEA, the OPCW does not have
express authority to invoke a challenge inspection, although the Executive
Council can prevent it by a three-quarters vote. While full NPT adoption
of the CWC's invocation process may be inappropriate and should not
limit the IAEA's authority to call for a special inspection, empowering
individual states to initiate the special or extended access inspection
process may strengthen the regime by giving States Parties a greater stake
in membership.
CWC challenge inspections are, by definition, accusatory and will
likely stigmatize the challenged State Party. The same can be said of NPT
special inspections. Indeed, special inspections may create even greater
turmoil than a challenge inspection because the consequences of a
clandestine nuclear weapons program are so grave. As formulated,
"extended access" inspections will not necessarily insinuate wrongdoing.
This departure from the CWC approach may be preferred, and the IAEA
might consider a less accusatory format given the sensitive political
environment that surrounds NPT inspections.
3. Non-refusable Special Inspections
CWC States Parties may not refuse a challenge inspection of a facility,
declared or otherwise. While some commentators have claimed that non-
refusability applies to NPT special inspections, past practice indicates that
States Parties have had the right to refuse special inspections.2 The IAEA
could include an obligation to accept inspections in any future verification
arrangements. This idea already has support: "In no circumstances would
the State have the right to refuse inspections aimed at the resolution of
questions about possible undeclared activities. '"293
294. See FiSCHER, supra note 18, at 72-73.
295. SAGS! Report, supra note 19, at app. 11-8.
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4. Right of Access to Undeclared Sites
The most innovative, and controversial, aspect of challenge inspections
is the OPCW's explicit right of access to "any facility or location." While
the IAEA has claimed a right of access to undeclared sites under the
NPT's special inspection procedures, national safeguards agreements do
not explicitly grant it. Even if the IAEA has this right, it can be invoked
only pursuant to consultations whereas the CWC requires States Parties
to grant access. This capability to investigate sites even if not safeguarded
or declared is crucial to discovering clandestine operations that are wholly
outside a State Party's network of declared nuclear processes. To protect
states against harassment, if the IAEA considers a similar capability, CWC
mechanisms for Executive Council rejection of frivolous or bogus
requests, coupled with the threat of requiring a requesting State to pay the
costs of bogus inspections, could be a model.
5. Specification of Inspection Procedures and Powers of Inspectors
The CWC specifies procedures and grants inspectors powers that the
NPT could emulate, including: requirements for a detailed inspection
request; a means to define the inspection perimeter; activities related to
securing the site (e.g., inspecting vehicles and monitoring traffic); and
perimeter activities (e.g., taking samples from various media). While these
specific powers are appropriate to the exigencies of a challenge inspection,
it might be logical to consider adoption of the CWC's inspection powers
for challenge inspections in light of the options for strengthening routine
inspections discussed in Section III.
6. Increased Protection of Confidential Information
The CWC's procedures for managed access negotiations and to protect
confidential information offer important lessons for limiting the scope of
access that may be transferable to the NPT context. Because of the
sensitivity of inspecting nuclear-related facilities, NPT States Parties
subject to special or "extended access" inspections would appreciate, if
not demand, inclusion of a credible plan to limit access that protects
confidential information irrelevant to the verification task. States may be
less likely to resist inspection of undeclared sites if confidential informa-
tion is adequately protected. Presumably, protection of confidential
information is a suitable subject for special inspection consultations, yet
an obligatory plan to limit exposure of this information is absent in
safeguards agreements. The IAEA could consider how managed access-
type procedures could enhance the acceptability of additional inspection
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measures, thereby increasing the cooperation from States Parties and
improving the effectiveness of extended access verification. Consultations
prior to extended access inspections could take cognizance of sensitive
information, and the State Party and the IAEA could negotiate access to
the facility or information such that confidentiality is not compromised.
7. Specification of Special Inspection Procedures and Powers
A crucial distinction between CWC challenge inspections and NPT
special inspections (as well as contemplated "extended access" inspections)
is that the CWC explicitly specifies at great length what activities may be
undertaken, by whom, and with what limitations. NPT procedures to be
followed during special inspections are not elaborated to nearly the degree
of CWC challenge inspections. Arguably, IAEA inspectors have similar
rights and powers, but the lack of strict rules undermines confidence that
compliance concerns can be efficiently and even-handedly investigated.
If new arrangements are negotiated, the IAEA could adopt the CWC
approach by clearly defining the range of facilities that can be inspected
and the procedures to be followed. This specificity would not limit
inspection activities but would provide the aegis for greater flexibility.
V. CONCLUSION: LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW APPROACHES
The discovery of would-be proliferants and the emergence of sub-state
actors with nuclear ambitions highlights the need to strengthen the
detection and prevention capabilities of nuclear non-proliferation mecha-
nisms. Accordingly, the IAEA should be properly equipped and authorized
to confirm compliance with NPT safeguards obligations and to identify
states that threaten international security. The IAEA has acknowledged this
imperative and has initiated an extensive plan of action. Due to experienc-
es with Iraq and North Korea, the IAEA has proposed several mechanisms
to improve the efficacy of comprehensive safeguards. This article has
discussed an important element of that plan - enhancing the IAEA's
capability to detect illicit activities and facilities through application of
some of the verification techniques provided by the recently concluded
CWC.
Comparison of the NPT and the CWC reveals three underlying
principles that deserve special note. First, both regimes share a nearly
identical overall approach to verification, each consisting of three ele-
ments:
* a scheme of record keeping and reporting of critical materials which
forms the verifiable basis of the regime;
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" a system of initial and routine inspections of plant sites and locations
therein that are declared to have those critical materials; and
* a mechanism to permit inspections of sites that raise compliance con-
cerns.
Second, despite employing the same verification methodology, the
NPT and the CWC regimes have distinctive verification objectives due
mainly to differences in the materials and activities of concern. The result
is a remarkably stringent system of material. accountancy under the NPT
and broad-based declaration and inspection requirements under the CWC.
Third, this article has stressed that, with respect to every element of
verification, the CWC is much more explicit and comprehensive in setting
out specific requirements and inspector powers. This clear enumeration
of rights and obligations in a single document contrasts sharply with the
NPT regime where critical requirements are split among multiple, legally
significant documents, often with less clarity and detail. This lack of
specificity has not hindered IAEA verification efforts in heavily industrial-
ized States Parties with no nuclear weapons aspirations. However, States
Parties less agreeable to the IAEA's non-proliferation mandate can and
may seize upon ambiguity to hinder verification.
This discussion has revealed numerous areas where the CWC's
verification scheme might be instructive, resulting in a lengthy list of
options and alternatives to improve NPT safeguards. Specifically, the
options for the NPT suggested by the CWC are: (1) establish an expanded
declarations scheme to apply to a greater number of substances, equip-
ment, and activities than are currently subject to comprehensive safe-
guards; (2) elaborate a routine inspection scheme to cover these newly
declared facilities and additional activities within safeguarded facilities,
including a risk-based modality to determine the frequency and intensity
of these inspections; (3) strengthen the effectiveness of routine inspections
at currently safeguarded facilities and at newly declared sites by address-
ing inspector issues and enlarging the scope of inspections; and (4)
establish a suspicion-based inspection scheme to gain access to undeclared
sites, using either current special inspection authority or pursuant to a
newly-formed scheme for extended access.
A. Methods of Implementation
It is appropriate to briefly consider three methods to implement these
new approaches from the CWC in the NPT context. First, the IAEA could
pursue new measures by interpreting its authority under INFCIRC/153
safeguards agreements, but without reopening those agreements. Second,
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the IAEA Board of Governors could, under its statutory authority, mandate
new measures beyond those currently embodied in INFCIRC/153. Third,
new measures could be adopted by negotiating a new, supplemental
arrangement for verification measures without changing or reopening
INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements.
1. Interpret INFCIRC/153 Safeguards Agreements
Existing NPT safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 may
authorize implementation of various new measures. Provisions for
enhancing verification with respect to designation of inspectors, logistic
and other support, and privileges and immunities clearly may be imple-
mented by a Board of Governors interpretation of INFCIRC/153 para-
graphs 9, 10, 85 and 86.2' Through similar logic, it may be possible for
a Board of Governors directive to require better preparation for inspections
through enhanced notification requirements, more precise stipulation of
entry and transportation mechanisms, and even pre-inspection briefings.
These options, which do not go to the core of the verification scheme, are
consistent with the existing structure; therefore, their implementation may
be permissible through the IAEA's discretionary authority.
Extending the scope of IAEA access, by contrast, may be less
appropriate for implementation through a directive pursuant to
INFCIRC/153. Mandating an expanded declarations scheme and, con-
comitantly, extending required routine inspections to newly declared
facilities and additional activities within safeguarded facilities might
exceed the IAEA's heretofore recognized unilateral authority under
INFCIRC/1 53. Similarly, an extensive environmental monitoring program
at locations other than already-safeguarded strategic points may require
a new agreement. However, the IAEA could commence a scheme for
expanded declarations or access that could establish a precedent for those
procedures which, over time, could become an accepted exercise of NPT
safeguards authority.
INFCIRC/153 national safeguards agreements contain a consultation
mechanism that may enable inspectors to conduct "special inspections"
of areas in addition to the access allowed for routine inspections.297 While
most recent commentary indicates support for a broad reading of the
power to inspect undeclared sites, such authority necessarily remains
subject to the consultative process that ultimately falls back upon the
296. See United States Comments, supra note 203.
297. The IAEA "may make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort... and
may obtain access in agreement with the State to information or locations in addition to the
access specified ... for ad hoc and routine inspections." INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 77.
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dispute resolution mechanisms in paragraphs 21 and 22 of INFCIRC/153.
Accordingly, the IAEA may already have the right, subject to consultation,
to seek access to undeclared areas within safeguarded sites and to unde-
clared sites pursuant to INFCIRC/153.
2. Apply Measures Under the IAEA Statute
The IAEA Statute could be interpreted to permit the Board of
Governors to mandate verification measures without renegotiating the
IAEA Statute, the NPT, or individual safeguards agreements. Article III
(A)(5) of the IAEA Statute provides in relevant part:
A. The Agency is authorized:
5. To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that
special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment,
facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at
its request or under its supervision or control are not used in
such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply
safeguards, at the request, of the parties, to any bilateral or
multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of
that State's activities in the field of atomic energy.
Furthermore, Article XII (A)(6) of the Statute provides in relevant part:
A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where
the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards,
the Agency shall have the following rights and responsibilities to the
extent relevant to the project or arrangement:
6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States
inspectors who shall have access at all times to all places and
data to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with
materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this
Statute to be safeguarded, as necessary ... to determine whether
there is compliance with any conditions prescribed in the agree-
ment between the Agency and the State or States concerned.
The question arises as to how, in light of these provisions, the IAEA
may implement any of the new approaches found in the CWC. Article
XII(A)(6) bestows on the IAEA extensive inspection authority to verify
the agreements over which the IAEA has jurisdiction. 298 However, the
298. See FiSCHER, supra note 18, at 72. In particular, section 7 of INFCIRC/153 may
condition safeguards agreements on States Parties' commitment to "establish and maintain a
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extent of the IAEA's power to implement new measures solely by resort
to the authority of its Statute is limited by the requirement that such
authority may be exercised only with regard to any IAEA project or
safeguards arrangement. Because the IAEA interprets a safeguards
agreement as an "agreement" under Article XII(A)(6), this inspection right
can be read to be available to verify compliance under a safeguards
agreement.299 The point here is that additional access can be "relevant" to
the arrangement even if it is not specifically authorized under that
arrangement.
The key legal question raised by the possibility that Article XII(A)(6)
can be invoked to justify new measures is how it coexists with the
inspection provisions of safeguards agreements negotiated pursuant to
INFCIRC/153. One view holds that INFCIRC/153 "whittles down" the
IAEA's authority to verify compliance. In this formulation, Article
XII(A)(6) has, in effect, been defined to permit only the specific types of
inspection provided in the safeguards agreements negotiated under
INFCIRC/153. 300 However, if Article XII(A)(6) can be interpreted as being
legally unaffected by subsequent safeguards agreements, then this verifica-
tion authority can be regarded as independent of the ad hoc, routine, and
special inspections provided for in safeguards agreements under
INFCIRC/153. 30' A consequence of this conclusion might be that the
IAEA Board of Governors could prescribe additional verification measures
without amending existing safeguards agreements or negotiating new
verification arrangements.'
No clear answer exists to this question. The strongest legal argument
in favor of broad Article XII(A)(6) authority is that its plain meaning is
system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards." See generally
BUNN, supra note 100.
299. See Strengthening ofAgency Safeguards, att. 1, at 5 n.3, IAEA Document, GOV/2554
(Nov. 12, 1991).
300. See Szasz, supra note 63, at 105-06.
301.
One possible approach to [the question of access during IAEA inspections] would
be for the Board of Governors to issue an interpretation of the relevant provisions
of INFCIRC/153, stipulating that nothing in a safeguards agreement can derogate
from the rights a State grants to the IAEA when that State ratifies, and hence
undertakes as a treaty obligation, the IAEA Statute.
United States Comments, supra note 203, at 3.
302. Cf The Agency's Inspectorate, supra note 187, which includes extensive inspection
authority in article III, 1 9 of its Annex, but which specifies at paragraph 3 that these provisions
"are not mandatory." Presumably, absent such a limitation, analogous arrangements could be
made so.
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expansive and grants extremely intrusive inspection authority 3°3 to the
IAEA.' However, the IAEA has never invoked its statutory authority to
conduct verification activities besides those specified in safeguards
agreements, 30 5 and, thus, the meaning may be more constrained than it
appears.30 Moreover, since Article XII(A)(6) only speaks to the right of
inspection, the extent to which it authorizes a new scheme of expanded
declarations is unclear. It only provides that inspectors may have access
to places, data, and persons to verify "conditions prescribed in the
agreement." To the extent that expanded declarations would constitute
those underlying conditions, they must be authorized elsewhere - perhaps
in the safeguards agreements themselves or pursuant to a new arrange-
ment.
With respect to current safeguards agreements, Article XII(A)(6) could
authorize new measures for designating, processing, protecting, or
supporting IAEA inspection teams. It could also justify more specific
preroutine inspection procedures, such as more informative inspection
notices and more explicit inspector transport requirements. Similarly,
Article XII(A)(6) could authorize an environmental sampling program.
Finally, if expanded declarations are implemented through a new ar-
rangement rather than under existing safeguards agreements, a broad
interpretation of Article XII(A)(6) might even authorize a more extensive
routine inspection system to verify those expanded declarations, including
access to newly declared areas in safeguarded facilities or to newly
declared facilities.
3. New Model Arrangements
Negotiating a new arrangement or an optional protocol to
INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements to implement various of the verifi-
cation measures discussed in this article may have several benefits. First,
arrangements may be necessary for any measures that the IAEA lacks the
303. An issue requiring further analysis is how to implement Article XII(A)(6) inspections
at sites that are neither safeguarded nor newly declared consistent with the special inspection
procedures in INFCIRC/153.
304. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. The United States has not ratified this treaty.
305. Furthermore, if the negotiating record for the NPT or for national safeguards
agreements indicates that the IAEA reached understandings with various States Parties that the
only inspections permitted would be those specified in national safeguards agreements, it would
tend to establish that any ambiguity should be resolved against application of Article XII(A)(6)
inspection authority. "The major industrial non-nuclear-weapon states, whose ratification of the
NPT was essential if it was to be a meaningful treaty, did not want to give foreign inspectors
the right to roam around freely on their territory." FISCHER, supra note 18, at 72.
306. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 304, art. 31(3).
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unilateral authority to mandate. Second, a new arrangement negotiated
between the IAEA and States Parties, based on a comprehensive model
arrangement that can be presented to all States Parties and to which States
Parties consent in advance, could provide for a clearly defined and non-
refusable set of verification measures, including those discussed herein.
Third, if a new arrangement is successfully implemented by numerous
States Parties, its requirements will become standard IAEA practice which
could be applied to less cooperative States Parties that have not agreed
to the new arrangement. Such a document would have to build on and
avoid contradiction with existing INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements,
and its elaboration should include the participation of as many States
Parties as possible to enhance its acceptability.
B. Areas of Further Inquiry
This article has not explicitly recommended any single course of
action, but it suggests the merits of analyzing some issues more in-depth
and developing a framework for their implementation. Substantial work
remains on many of the important elements of the IAEA's and SAGSI's
plan for improving safeguards. While this article has attempted to lend
contours and greater understanding to many of the IAEA's or SAGSI's
proposals, and has addressed the benefits and pitfalls of adopting particular
methodologies, details critical to their implementation have not yet been
addressed.
For example, with respect to the concepts of "expanded declarations"
and enhancing the breadth and effectiveness of the NPT routine inspection
regime, several questions remain unanswered. What relevant non-nuclear
materials should be subject to new declaration requirements? What types
of dual-use technologies should be declared? What newly declared items
or facilities should be subject to routine inspections? Which CWC-like
inspection procedures and techniques to increase inspectors powers and
access are most suitable for the NPT? This article has also analyzed CWC
challenge inspection requirements with reference to the IAEA's stated
objective of obtaining access to undeclared activities and facilities through
the principle of "extended access." However, adopting such a complex
scheme, given all of its political and practical implications, requires more
thorough analysis. Important issues concerning the adaptability of managed
access procedures to the NPT context, the financial implications of
maintaining an "extended access" capability, and the additional powers
to be granted inspectors, among others, must be addressed.
It is also important to note that implementing new NPT verification
measures has potential legal consequences that require examination. The
legal implications of extensive and intrusive verification activities have
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already been thoroughly analyzed in regard to the CWC, and implemen-
tation measures have been suggested to mitigate any possible transgres-
sions of protected rights. 307 In adopting analogous verification activities
under the NPT, potential legal hurdles should be considered. The most
pressing set of legal problems derives from the possibility that NPT
inspections, currently limited to a small number of government-owned or
highly regulated private facilities, could take place at many more sites,
including some commercial facilities that are less regulated.
If the NPT regime implements new measures resembling the CWC's
more penetrating verification activities, then intrusive inspections of newly
declared privately operated commercial facilities (in addition to govern-
ment-operated or extraordinarily regulated installations) could threaten
protected privacy rights. The right to personal privacy is universally
acknowledged, and virtually every nation's laws explicitly protect it.
3°8
Commonly, privately-owned regulated entities must tolerate on-site
inspections to verify that they comply with their legal obligations so long
as an inspection proceeds with a search warrant issued by a judge or
administrator.' Yet, the CWC does not - and presumably new NPT
measures would not - countenance such a requirement. While IAEA in-
spectors presumably will give advance notice to representatives of the
State Party, this notice will not necessarily be extended to the owner or
operator of a private facility subject to inspection.
307. See generally B. KELLMAN, D. GUALTIERI, E. TANZMAN, AND W. GRIMES, MANUAL
FOR NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1993) [hereinafter
CWC MANUAL]; Kellman, Tanzman, Gualtieri, and Bassiouni, A Comparative Study of the Legal
Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Foreign Jurisdictions (DNA-TR-93-59)
(1993).
308.
This right appears in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Human Rights system, the United Nations Norms and Standards, and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Article 12 of the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides "No one shall be subject to arbitrary interfer-
ence with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, no[r] to attacks upon his
honor and reputation." Similarly, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights provides "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, no[r] to unlawful
attacks off] his honor and reputation."
See CWC MANUAL, supra note 307, at 57.
309. Various justifications exist for subjecting industries to administrative regulation and
inspection, including the promotion of public health, taxation and fiscal matters, safety, security,
and morality. For example, industries that pollute or impact the environment are typically subject
to regulation and inspection. Similarly, many countries require inspections of facilities that
handle hazardous substances. Notably, industries related to arms production and defense are
typically subject to inspections.
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The potential dilemma for States Parties is that any legal limit to NPT
inspections, including a requirement for a search warrant, could impede
NPT verification and thereby contravene its requirements. A search
warrant requirement could impermissibly delay inspectors or limit the
scope of inspections in a manner inconsistent with the new measures. In
some states, requiring warrants could raise the possibility that NPT
inspection requests may be denied altogether. To ameliorate the potential
difficulties, new NPT inspections of commercial facilities, like those under
the CWC,3" ° should be incorporated into the system of administrative
regulation that, in many states, subjects industrial facilities to inspections
while protecting privacy rights in a way that does not obstruct effective
verification.3 '
Verification activities pursuant to either the CWC or the NPT also
present several situations that could threaten confidential business infor-
mation (CBI), including trade secrets and other proprietary business-related
data. This is a primary concern of industries worried that arms control
reporting obligations and on-site inspections may result in CBI loss.3" 2
Many of the same technologies that comprise nuclear weapons also have
important commercial applications; control of these dual use technologies
demands the regulation of highly competitive, leading industries that have
invested massively in research and development. Retaining the technical
knowledge that is the fruit of that investment is essential to these firms
in order to recoup their investment and make a profit.
Most nations legally protect CBI, although the source of that protec-
tion varies. Many countries recognize CBI as property that the government
cannot take without due process of law and unless just compensation is
paid to the owner. In general, protection of CBI depends upon the
310. Compare CWC, supra note 24, art. VII, I I ("Each State Party shall, in accordance
with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under
this Convention.") with INFCIRC/153, supra note 1, 3 ("The Agreement should provide that
the Agency and the State shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards
provided for therein.") and with IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. IV(C) ("The Agency is based
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all of its members, and all members, in order to
ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good
faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute.").
311. CWC MANUAL, supra note 307, at 62, 99-101.
312. CBI includes any information that gives its holder a commercial advantage because
it is not widely known to competitors or the general public. CBI can consist of either technical
or non-technical forms of information, including formulas, patterns, compilations, programs,
devices, methods, techniques, drawings, processes, financial data, price codes, customer lists,
economic studies, cost reports, and bookkeeping methods. See Kellman, supra note 83.
313. CWC MANUAL, supra note 307, at 74-75. Unlike patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
domestic statutes often do not recognize CBI. In the absence of statutory protection, CBI is
protected under a patchwork of legal doctrines. In nations where CBI is not specifically
recognized as property, its unauthorized disclosure may be prohibited by laws relating to
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careful handling of the information by its owner and those obligated to
maintain its confidentiality. 314 States Parties can take some basic precau-
tions to limit CBI disclosure during verification activities. Disclosure of
information could be limited to the bare minimum required by the NPT
regime, taking care not to unnecessarily transmit confidential information
to the IAEA. Second, governments could enact domestic statutes to
preserve the confidentiality of CBI and forbid all disclosures not statutorily
authorized.
C. Concluding Observations
This article focuses on how IAEA verification authority may be
extended to apply to: more materials and technologies, more areas within
already safeguarded facilities, more sites currently not covered by national
safeguards agreements, and sites that are not declared under national
safeguards agreements nor under expanded declarations.
Implementing substantial changes to the NPT regime (such as creating
an "expanded declarations" scheme, increasing the amount of routine
inspections, or adopting "extended access" inspections) will, as discussed
above, probably require an extensive and detailed arrangement between
the IAEA and States Parties. An indispensable step in that process is the
drafting of a model arrangement similar to INFCIRC/1 53, ideally with the
participation of as many States Parties as possible. Analytical work should
begin as to which options and alternatives should be included in any such
arrangement.
Transcending all of this article's technical detail is the principle that
the process of improving NPT safeguards must begin by identifying the
norms of verification that have been incorporated into the international law
of weapons control. This article contends that the CWC stands currently
at the pinnacle of this law. With respect to nearly every aspect of verifica-
tion, the CWC comprehensively sets out specific requirements and
inspection powers. This clear enumeration of rights and obligations is a
progressive step toward international law-making and suggests the
importance of specifying the IAEA's and the State Party's rights and
obligations under any NPT arrangement that may be developed. For
twenty-five years, the NPT regime has kept a lid on the spread of nuclear
contracts, unfair competition, breach of a confidential relationship, or torts. There is no time
limit to CBI protection; as long as the owner can maintain its secrecy, CBI will be given legal
protection.
314. Id. at 75. CBI can be protected by physical means or through contracts that establish
binding confidential relationships. CBI will not receive legal protection if its owner voluntarily
discloses it to someone not obligated to maintain its secrecy. In addition, CBI is not protected
from legitimate independent discovery (e.g., by means of reverse engineering).
1110 [Vol. 16:1029
Summer 1995] Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1111
weapons through a combination of technological barriers, political
restraints, and luck. Now it is incumbent to endow the NPT with the
certainty and power of law.

